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Abstract
This thesis studies the relationship between asymmetric information, imper-
fect competition, and market structure in the Italian banking sector. In three coher-
ently connected chapters it extends and adapts different structural models from the
literature in empirical industrial organization to the special case of the credit market,
introducing informational asymmetries between lenders and between borrowers and
lenders.
The first chapter gives an introductory overview of the thesis, outlying the
fundamental contribution of each paper.
In the second chapter, we measure the consequences of asymmetric informa-
tion in the Italian market for small business lines of credit. We estimate models
of demand for credit, loan pricing, loan use, and firm default based on the seminal
work of Stiglitz and Weiss [1981]. Preliminary results suggest evidence of asymmet-
ric information, separately identifying adverse selection and moral hazard. We use
our results to quantify the impact of asymmetric information on pricing and welfare,
and the role imperfect competition plays in mediating these effects.
In the third chapter, we look at whether asymmetric information is a poten-
tial determinant of market structure in the banking industry. We measure welfare
under different counterfactual scenarios, with and without borrower-lender asym-
metric information and reducing incumbents’ informational advantage. We develop
a dynamic structural game of banks’ entry, exit and investment with learning by
branching based on Weintraub et al. [2008b], together with a static framework of
firms’ demand for credit, loan size, default and banks’ pricing, that allows us to
identify the effect of asymmetric information on market structure.
In the fourth chapter, we measure the impact of endogenous multi market
contact on entry decisions of Italian national banks. We develop a static model
of market structure with incomplete information as in Seim [2006], allowing for
global players’ heterogeneity and spatial correlation of entry decisions across different
local markets. Preliminary results show that multi market contact enhances banks’
profitability, suggesting that it might facilitate implicit collusion as in Bernheim and
Whinston [1990].
The fifth chapter concludes, summarizing the main findings and tracing out
the directions for future research.
xi
Chapter 1
Introduction
Asymmetric information is an important matter in insurance and credit markets.
Theoretical work on asymmetric information has grown extensively since the 1970s,
starting from the pioneering papers by Arrow [1963], Akerlof [1970] and Rothschild
and Stiglitz [1976], explaining the inefficiencies caused by this source of market
failure. For the credit market in particular, Stiglitz and Weiss [1981] have shown how
asymmetric information can lead to an equilibrium with credit rationing. However,
the empirical counterpart has gained increasing interest only in the last decade. This
delay is partially because of lack of data, but mostly because asymmetric information
is by definition something that is hard to measure. In fact, adverse selection is based
on hidden information, and moral hazard is based on hidden actions. So far, the
empirical literature has focussed mainly on testing for selection in insurance markets,
and on estimating the welfare consequences of detected selection and of potential
public policy interventions.1
One of the first important empirical contributions is the positive correlation
test for asymmetric information, developed by Chiappori and Salanié [2000]. This
test compares claim rates for consumers who self select into different insurance con-
tracts. There is evidence of either adverse selection or moral hazard if, conditional
on all the observable characteristics of consumers, those who select more coverage
have also higher claim rates. This is identified through the correlation between the
unobservables that determine demand for coverage and the unobservables that de-
termine claim behavior. However, this method cannot disentangle the two forms of
asymmetric information, and doesn’t provide the necessary structure to determine
the efficiency of the market through counterfactual policy experiments. For this
reason, the literature has developed a more structural approach that incorporates
1 Einav et al. [2010a] provide an excellent survey of empirical models of insurance markets.
1
heterogeneity in consumer preferences and risk, allowing to do welfare analysis.
Also these structural frameworks are based on the correlation between un-
observables in models of consumers’ choice of insurance and their following claim
behavior. However, the use of richer theoretical foundations allows to answer to a
wider range of questions. One area of interest focuses on the expected utility the-
ory, separately identifying heterogeneity in risk and risk aversion (Cohen and Einav
[2007], Einav et al. [2010b]). Another area relies on discrete choice models, usually
applied in empirical industrial organization, and tries to combine asymmetric infor-
mation and imperfect competition (Lustig [2011], Starc [2013], Einav et al. [2012]).
The second chapter of this thesis contributes to the latter approach, inves-
tigating the welfare consequences of asymmetric information in the Italian market
for small business lines of credit. It extends the model of Einav et al. [2012] to
the Italian oligopolistic banking sector, showing how market power can mitigate the
inefficiencies of asymmetric information between borrowers and lenders. It develops
a structural model of firms’ demand for credit, loan use and default and of banks’
pricing that separately identifies adverse selection and moral hazard.
The third chapter of this thesis builds on the framework of the second chapter
to analyze the effects of asymmetric information on market structure in the banking
industry. It combines the theoretical (Dasgupta and Stiglitz [1988], Cabral and
Riordan [1994], Besanko et al. [2010]) and empirical (Benkard [2000], Benkard [2004])
literature on the strategic implication of learning by doing into a dynamic structural
game of banks’ entry, exit and investment with learning by branching based on
Weintraub et al. [2008b] and Weintraub et al. [2008a], which allows incumbent banks
to learn about their borrowers and acquire an informational advantage over potential
entrants. This can in turn lead to informational entry barriers and concentration in
the banking sector.
The fourth chapter investigates the effect of multi market contact between
the main Italian credit institutions on market structure. Since the theoretical con-
tribution of Bernheim and Whinston [1990], who formalized the collusive gains from
multiple contacts across markets, most of the empirical literature has focussed on
the impact of multiple links on firms’ profits, taking market structure as given. This
work instead endogenizes market structure and the network of contacts among play-
ers. It allows banks to have private information about their profitability, as in Seim
[2006], and to decide their branching strategy based on the links with their rivals in
neighboring markets.
The last chapters draws the conclusions of this thesis and outlines the direc-
tions for future work.
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Abstract
We measure the consequences of asymmetric information and imperfect competi-
tion in the Italian market for small business lines of credit. We provide evidence
that a bank’s optimal price response to an increase in adverse selection varies de-
pending on the degree of competition in its local market. More adverse selection
causes prices to increase in competitive markets, but can have the opposite effect
in more concentrated ones, where banks trade off higher markups and the desire
attract safer borrowers. This implies both that imperfect competition can moderate
the welfare losses from adverse selection, and that adverse selection can moderate
the welfare losses from market power. Exploiting detailed data on a representative
sample of Italian firms, the population of medium and large Italian banks, individ-
ual lines of credit between them, and subsequent defaults, we estimate models of
demand for credit, loan pricing, loan use, and firm default to measure the extent
and consequences of asymmetric information in this market. While our data in-
clude a measure of observable credit risk available to a bank during the application
process, we allow firms to have private information about the underlying riskiness
of their project. This riskiness influences banks’ pricing of loans as higher interest
rates attract a riskier pool of borrowers, increasing aggregate default probabilities.
We find evidence of adverse selection in the data, and conduct a policy experiment
to double its magnitude. As predicted, in this counterfactual scenario equilibrium
prices rise in more competitive markets and decline in more concentrated ones.
2.1 Introduction
Following the seminal work of Akerlof [1970] and Rothschild and Stiglitz [1976],
a large theoretical literature has stressed the key role of asymmetric information
in financial markets. This literature has shown that asymmetric information can
generate market failures such as credit rationing, inefficient provision, misprincing
of risk and, in the limit, market breakdown.1 Indeed, the recent financial crisis can
be seen as an extreme manifestation of the problems that asymmetric information
can cause. Deepening our understanding of the extent and causes of asymmetric
information is key for the design of a regulatory framework that limits their negative
consequences.
Although the basic theoretical issues are well understood, empirical work is
fairly rare. Asymmetric information is by definition hard to measure. If a financial
intermediary, such as an insurer or a lender, has an information disadvantage with
respect to a potential insuree/borrower, it is very unlikely that such a disadvantage
can be overcome by the researcher, if not in experimental settings. While one cannot
generally construct measures of the ex-ante unobserved characteristics determining
riskyness, it is often possible to observe ex-post outcomes, such as filing a claim to an
insurance company or defaulting on a loan. The empirical literature has been built
on these facts, analyzing how agents with different ex-post outcomes self select ex-
ante into contracts (if any) with different characteristics in terms of price, coverage,
deductibles etc. (Chiappori and Salanié [2000], Abbring et al. [2003], Lustig [2011],
Einav et al. [2012], Starc [2013]).
We measure the consequences of asymmetric information and imperfect com-
petition in the Italian market for small business lines of credit. We exploit de-
tailed, proprietary data on a representative sample of Italian firms, the population
of medium and large Italian banks, individual lines of credit between them, and sub-
sequent individual defaults. While our data include a measure of observable credit
risk comparable to that available to a bank during the application process, in our
model we allow firms to have private information about the underlying riskiness of
the project they seek to finance. The market is characterized by adverse selection
if riskier firms are more likely to demand credit. As shown by Stiglitz and Weiss
[1981], in this setting an increase in the interest rate exacerbates adverse selection,
inducing a deterioration in the quality of the pool of borrowers. We formulate and
structurally estimate a model of credit demand, loan size, default, and bank pricing
based on the insights in Stiglitz and Weiss [1981] that allows us to estimate the ex-
1See, for example, Banerjee and Newman [1993], Bernanke and Gertler [1990], DeMeza and
Webb [1987], Gale [1990], Hubbard [1998], Mankiw [1986], Mookherjee and Ray [2002].
tent of adverse selection in the market and to run counterfactuals that approximate
economic environments of likely concern to policymakers.
One key contribution of our paper is that we study adverse selection in an
imperfectly competitive market. This differs from most of the previous literature,
that, due to data limitation or to specific market features, has assumed either per-
fectly competitive markets, or imperfectly competitive markets subject to significant
regulatory oversight. Assuming perfect competition in the market for small business
loans is not desirable, given the local nature of small business lending and the high
degree of market concentration at the local level, the latter due to entry barriers in
the Italian banking sectors that persisted into the 1990s. We show that the degree of
competition can have significant consequences on the equilibrium effects of asymmet-
ric information. Intuitively, with perfect competition banks price at average costs
(e.g. Einav and Finkelstein (2011)). When adverse selection increases, the price also
rises, as a riskier pool of borrowers implies higher average costs in the form of more
defaults. When banks exert market power, however, greater adverse selection can
lower prices, as it implies a riskier pool of borrowers at any given price, lowering infra
marginal benefits of price increases in the standard (e.g. monopoly) pricing calculus.
This implies both that imperfect competition can moderate the welfare losses from
asymmetric information and that adverse selection can moderate the welfare losses
of market power.
To analyze these questions, we construct a model where banks offer standard-
ized contracts to observationally equivalent firms. Loan contracts are differentiated
products in terms of, among other characteristics, the amount granted, a bank’s
network of branches, the years a bank has been in a market, and distance from the
closest branch. Banks set interest rates by competing Bertrand-Nash. Firms seek
lines of credit to finance the ongoing activities associated with a particular business
project, the riskiness of which is private information to the firm. Firms choose the
preferred loan, if any, according to a mixed logit demand system. They also choose
how much of the credit line to use. Finally, they decide if to repay the loan or
default. The degree of adverse selection is determined by two correlations: that be-
tween the unobservable determinants of the choice to take up a loan and default and
that between unobserved determinants of how much of that loan to use and default.
For a given interest rate, firms’ expected profits are increasing with risk due to the
insurance effect of loans: banks share a portion of the costs of unsuccessful projects.
As a result, higher-risk firms are more willing to demand higher-rate loans. This, in
turn, influences the profitability of rate increases by banks.2 We show with a Monte
2Handel [2013], Lustig [2011], and Starc [2013] find similar effects of adverse selection and
7
Carlo simulation that imperfect competition can indeed mitigate the effects of ad-
verse selection.3 The effects of asymmetric information on prices depends on market
power. When markets are competitive, more asymmetric information always leads
to higher rates and less credit. As banks’ market power increases, this relationship
becomes weaker and eventually turns negative.
We estimate the model on highly detailed microdata from the Bank of Italy
covering individual loans between firms and banks between 1988 and 1998. There
are two key elements of this data. The first, from the Italian Central Credit Register
(Centrale dei Rischi), provides detailed information on all individual loans extended
by the 90 largest Italian banks (which account for 80% of the loan market), including
the identity of the borrower and interest rate charged. It also reports whether the
firm subsequently defaulted. The second, from the Centrale dei Bilanci database,
provides detailed information on borrowers’ balance sheets. Critically, this second
dataset includes an observable measure of each firm’s default risk (SCORE). Com-
bining them yields a matched panel dataset of borrowers and lenders. While the data
span a 11-year period and most firms in the data take out multiple loans, in our em-
pirical analysis, we only use the first year of each firm’s main line of credit. This
avoids the need to model the dynamics of firm-bank relationships and the inferences
available to subsequent lenders of existing lines of credit.4 We define local markets
at the level of provinces, administrative units roughly comparable to a US county
that, as discussed in detail by Guiso et al. [2013], constitute a natural geographical
unit for small business lending. We estimate individual firms’ demand for credit,
banks’ pricing of these lines, firm’s loan use and subsequent default. We extend the
econometric approach taken by Einav et al. [2012] to the case of multiple lenders
by assuming unobserved tastes for credit independent of the specific bank chosen to
supply that credit.
and the literature on demand estimation for differentiated products Berry
[1994]; Berry et al. [1995]; Goolsbee and Petrin [2004]. Data on default, loan use,
demand, and pricing separately identify the distribution of private riskiness from
heterogeneous firm disutility from paying interest.
We find that the choice to borrow, the amount used and the decision to
imperfect competition in US health insurance markets. Each of these focuses on the price-reducing
effect of asymmetric information in the presence of imperfect competition. None articulates the
non-monotonicity of these effects depending on the strength of competition, an empirically relevant
result in our application.
3 In the Monte Carlo we vary the degree of competition changing the number of banks in the
market, as well as varying the price sensitivity of borrowers, which increases/decreases their utility
from the outside option of not borrowing.
4 A similar approach is followed, among others, by Chiappori and Salanié [2000]. We model the
dynamics of firm-bank relationships in a companion paper Pavanini and Schivardi [2013].
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default depend on observables as expected. In particular, a higher interest rate
reduces the probability that a firm borrows but, conditional on borrowing, increases
the default probability. Among other observables, older firms are both less likely
to demand credit, arguably because they have more internally generated funds, and
more likely to default. Firms with larger assets demand more credit and default
less. In terms of correlation in unobservables, we find a positive correlation between
the choice to borrow and default, and between how much loan to use and default.
We simulate with a counterfactual experiment the possible consequences of a credit
crunch, where risky firms become more exposed to financial distress than safe ones
and demand more credit. Our results show that when we increase the correlation
in the unobservables (thus increasing the extent of adverse selection), prices in most
markets increase, but they fall in some markets. The change in prices is related
to different measures of market concentration,5 supporting the view that market
concentration can mitigate the negative effects of asymmetric information. As a
consequence of this price decrease, the share of borrowing firms in more concentrated
markets increases, and their average default rate falls.
This paper contributes to two main strands of empirical work. The first is
the literature on empirical models of asymmetric information, so far mainly focussed
on insurance markets. We look at the less developed area of credit markets, where
the most recent applications have followed both experimental (Karlan and Zinman
[2009]) and structural (Einav et al. [2012]) approaches. Our novelty is to introduce
imperfect competition. We show that this is important, as the impact of asymmet-
ric information depends crucially on the nature of competition in the market. The
second field we contribute to is the literature on empirical banking, where we are not
aware of any structural model that seeks to measure the consequences of asymmet-
ric information and the role competition plays in mediating its effects. Nonetheless,
several reduced form papers on Italian banking provide motivation for a model that
structurally combines these two effects. For example, Bofondi and Gobbi [2006]
show evidence that new banks entering local markets perform poorly relative to in-
cumbents, as entrants experience higher default rates and concentration and default
rates are positively correlated. Gobbi and Lotti [2004] claim that there is a positive
correlation between branching and markets with low proprietary information ser-
vices, and that interest rate spreads are positively related to entry of de novo banks,
but not of banks existing in other markets. Finally, Panetta et al. [2009] show that
mergers enhance pricing of observable risk, as merged banks achieve a better match
5 In the counterfactuals we relate the equilibrium price variation to the estimated markups from
the demand model. We also experiment with HHI in terms of branches and loans.
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of interest rates and default risk, mainly due to better information processing.
The structure of the paper is the following. In Section 2 we describe the
dataset and the market, in Section 3 we present the reduced form tests of adverse
selection, Section 4 outlines the structural model, and Section 5 describes the econo-
metric specification of demand, loan size, default and supply. The estimation and
the results are in Section 6, the counterfactuals are in Section 7, Section 8 concludes.
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2.2 Data and Institutional Details
We use a unique dataset of small business credit lines, previously used in Panetta
et al. [2009].6 It is based on three main sources of data. Interest rate data and data
on outstanding loans are from the Italian Centrale dei Rischi, or Central Credit
Register. Firm-level balance sheet data are from the Centrale dei Bilanci database.
Banks’ balance-sheet and income-statement data are from the Banking Supervision
Register at the Bank of Italy. By combining these data, we obtain a matched panel
dataset of borrowers and lenders extending over an eleven-year period, between 1988
and 1998. We also collected data on bank branches at the local level since 1959.
The Central Credit Register (hereafter CR) is a database that contains de-
tailed information on individual bank loans extended by Italian banks. Banks must
report data at the individual borrower level on the amount granted and effectively
utilized for all loans exceeding a given threshold,7 with a breakdown by type of the
loan (credit lines, financial and commercial paper, collateralized loans, medium and
long-term loans and personal guarantees). Banks also report if they classify a loan
as bad, meaning that they attach a low probability to the event that the firm will be
able to repay the loan in full. We define a default as a loan being classified as bad.8
In addition, a subgroup of around 90 banks (accounting for more than 80 percent
of total bank lending) have agreed to file detailed information on the interest rates
they charge to individual borrowers on each type of loan.
We restrict our attention to short-term credit lines, which have ideal features
for our analysis. First, the bank can change the interest rate at any time, while
the borrower can close the credit line without notice. This means that differences
between the interest rates on loans are not influenced by differences in the maturity of
the loan. Second, the loan contracts included in the CR are homogeneous products,
so that they can be meaningfully compared across banks and firms. Third, they are
not collateralized, a key feature for our analysis, as adverse selection issues become
less relevant for collateralized borrowing. Fourth, short term bank loans are the
main source of borrowing of Italian firms. For example, in 1994 they represented
53 percent of the total debts according to the Flow of Funds data. We define the
interest rate as the ratio of the payment made in each year by the firm to the bank
6For reasons that will be explained below, in this paper we only use on a subset of the original
data. This section focusses on the description of this subset, referring the interested reader to
Panetta et al. [2009] for descriptive statistics of the full dataset.
7 The threshold was 41,000 euros (U.S. $42,000) until December 1995 and 75,000 euros thereafter.
8 We do not observe if a loan actually reverts to not being bad. However, this seems to be a
rather unlikely event. Moreover, classifying a loan as bad has a negative impact on bank accounting
ratios, even before the firm formally defaults. So this is clearly a costly event in itself for the bank.
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to the average amount of the loan. The interest payment includes the fixed expenses
charged by the bank to the firm (e.g. which encompass the cost of opening the credit
line or the cost of mailing the loan statement).
We focus on a subsample of the available data, namely on the main credit line
of the first year a firm opens at least one credit line. Considering only the first year
is a common assumption in static empirical models of insurance with asymmetric
information, starting from Chiappori and Salanié [2000]. This is done to avoid
modeling heterogenous experience ratings among borrowers and loan renegotiation,
challenging topics, and ones that we leave for future research. Moreover, we focus
on the main new credit line because it accounts on average for around 75% of the
total share of new yearly credit (both usable and used),9 even if in Italy multiple
relationship banking is widely used by firms to reduce liquidity risk (Detragiache
et al. [2000]). This means that we restrict our attention only to the first year in
which we observe a firm in our data.10 This reduces the sample size from around
90,000 firms to over 40,000.11 Table 2.1, Panel A reports the loan level information
that we use in the empirical analysis. Out of over 20,000 potential borrowers, 36%
take up a loan in our sample period, and use on average 80% of the amount granted.
Of these, around 15% end up being classified as bad loans within the following 3
years.12 The average amount granted is 350,000 euros, and the average interest rate
charged is just below 15%.
Panel B of Table 2.1 shows summary statistics for the 90 reporting banks.
The average total assets level is almost 11 billions, they employ 3,200 employees and
have a share of bad loans over total loans of 6%. The average bank is present in 34
provinces out of 95, but with great variation across banks.
The Centrale dei Bilanci (hereafter CB) collects yearly data on the balance
sheets and income statements of a sample of about 35,000 Italian non-financial and
non-agricultural firms. This information is collected and standardized by the CB,
that sells these data to banks for their lending decisions. The unique feature of
the CB data set is that, unlike other widely used data sets on individual companies
(such as the Compustat database of US companies), it has wide coverage of small
9 The main line is defined as the line for which the amount used, regardless of the amount
granted, is the highest. For cases in which multiple lines have the same amount used, then the one
with the lowest price is chosen.
10 To avoid left censoring issues we drop the first year of our sample (1988) and just look at new
relationships starting from 1989.
11 Due to computational constraints, we are able to estimate the model in this version of the paper
only on half of the sample. Therefore we randomly pick 50% of the province-year combinations in
our sample.
12 We classify a borrower as defaulter when any of its loans is pass due within the next 3 years
from the initial borrowing date.
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and medium companies; moreover, almost all the companies in the CB sample are
unlisted. The coverage of these small firms makes the data set particularly well
suited for our analysis, because informational asymmetries are potentially strongest
for these firms. Initially, data were collected by banks themselves and transmitted to
the CB. In time, the CB has increased the sample size drawing from balance sheets
deposited with the commerce chambers (limited liability companies are obliged to
file their balance sheets to the commerce chambers, that make them available to
the public). The database is fairly representative of the Italian non-financial sector.
The firms in the CB sample represent about 49.4% of the total sales reported in
the national accounting data for the Italian non-financial, non-agricultural sector.
In addition to collecting the data, the CB computes an indicator of the risk profile
of each firm (which we refer to in the remainder of this paper as the SCORE).
The SCORE represents our measure of a firm’s observable default risk. It takes
values from 1 to 9 and is computed annually using discriminant analysis based on a
series of balance sheet indicators (assets, rate of return, debts etc.) according to the
methodology described in Altman [1968] and Altman et al. [1994].
We defined a borrowing firm as one that shows up as a borrower in the CR
database. Non borrowing firms are defined according to two criteria: (a) they are not
in the CR database; (b) they report zero bank borrowing in their balance sheets. We
use the second definition to exclude firms that are not in our CR database but are
still borrowing from banks, either from one of the non-reporting banks or through
different loan contracts.13 Table 2.1, Panel C reports descriptive statistics for the
sample of borrowing and non-borrowing firms. These two groups of firms appear to
be fairly similar, except that borrowing firms seems to have more fixed assets and
be slightly younger on average. In terms of bank relations, our sample of borrowing
firms have on average around 3.4 credit lines active every year. They open one new
line every year and close 0.6. Note that these firms are mostly new borrowers, so
they are more likely to be in the process of expanding their number of relationships.
The share of credit used from the main line is around 70%, and it goes up to 75%
when a firm borrows for the first year. This shows that focusing on the main line
captures most of the credit that firms borrow, especially for new firms.
There is ample evidence that firms, particularly small businesses like the
ones in our sample, are tied to their local credit markets. For instance, Petersen and
Rajan [2002] and Degryse and Ongena [2005] show that lending to small businesses
is a highly localized activity as proximity between borrowers and lenders facilitates
13 This implies that we exclude from our sample around 27,000 firms that borrow from banks
not included in our sample, or borrow from the banks in our sample but using a different type of
loan. This might be a possible source of selection bias that we will need to investigate.
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information acquisition. Segmentation of local credit markets is thus very likely to
occur. In our market definition we will use provinces as our geographical units.
Provinces are administrative unit roughly comparable to a US county. They are a
proper measure of local markets in banking for at least three reasons. First, this
was the definition of a local market used by the Bank of Italy to decide whether to
authorize the opening of new branches when entry was regulated. Second, according
to the Italian Antitrust authority the ”relevant market” in banking for antitrust
purposes is the province. Third, the bankers’ rule of thumb is to avoid lending to
a client located more than three miles from the branch. At the time of our data,
there were 95 provinces. We report summary statistics of markets (defined more
precisely below) in Panel D of Table 2.1, which shows that there are almost 6 banks
per province-year in our sub-sample, each bank has on average almost 19 branches
per province, with a market share of 7% for both branches and loans. On average a
bank has been in a province for 22 years.14
14 We start counting the years from 1959, which is the first year that we observe in the branching
data.
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev.
Panel A: Demand 20,080 0.36 0.48
Loan Level Loan Size 7,170 0.81 1.34
Default 7,170 0.15 0.36
Amount Granted 7,170 352.85 409.68
Interest Rate 7,170 14.67 4.03
Panel B: Total Assets 900 10,726.8 16,965.6
Bank Level Employees 896 3,179.9 4,582.5
Bad Loans 893 6.2 6.3
Number of Provinces 861 34.54 30.19
Panel C: Borrowing Firms Non-Borrowing Firms
Firm Level Fixed Assets 7,170 2,631.52 11,136.64 12,876 1,597.84 7,705.57
Intangible/Tot Assets 7,170 0.19 0.25 12,876 0.19 0.27
Net Worth 7,170 1,441.18 4,683.39 12,876 1,591.21 6,845.24
Trade Debit 7,170 1,402.73 4,197.48 12,876 1,358.50 6,723.18
Profits 7,170 744.90 2,043.97 12,876 517.79 2,636.62
Cash Flow 7,170 441.37 1,754.81 12,876 474.47 2,362.71
Firm’s Age 7,170 11.68 11.83 12,876 13.76 13.37
Branch distance (km) 7,170 2.64 6.56
Number of Lenders 31,328 3.40 2.36
Lines Opened 31,328 1.04 1.55
Lines Closed 31,328 0.61 1.23
Share of Main Line 26,776 0.70 0.25
Share of Main New Line 6,095 0.74 0.25
Panel D: Number of Banks 386 5.90 4.11
Market level Number of Branches 2,279 18.77 31.34
Share of Branches 2,279 0.07 0.09
Years in Market 2,279 22.21 13.77
Market Shares 2,279 0.07 0.08
Note: In Panel A an observation is a firm for the first variable and a loan contract for the others.
Demand is a dummy for taking a loan or not, loan size is the share of amount used over granted,
default is a dummy for a firm having any of its loans classified as bad at most within 3 years
from demanding the loan we consider, amount granted is in thousands of euros. In Panel B an
observation is a bank-year. Employees is the number of employees at the end of the year. Bad
loans is a percentage of total loans. In Panel C an observation is a firm for the first 8 variables
and a firm-year for the others. The balance sheet variables in this panel are winsorized at the 1st
and 99th percentile. The SCORE is the indicator of the risk of the firm computed each year by
the CB (higher values indicate riskier companies). Number of lenders is the number of banks from
which the firm borrows through these credit lines. The last two variables represent the ratio of
credit utilized from the main line over total credit utilized, when credit utilized is non-zero. In
Panel D an observation is year-province for the number of banks, and bank-year-province for the
other variables. Number and share of branches are per bank-province-year, years in market are the
number of years a bank has been in a province for since 1959. Market shares are in terms of loans.
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2.3 Reduced Form Evidence
We conduct some reduced form analysis to test for evidence of asymmetric infor-
mation and to justify the use of a structural model. We follow the early empirical
literature on positive correlation tests introduced by Chiappori and Salanié [2000].
We propose two tests, one based on the choice to take up a loan and another based
on the choice of how much to draw on the credit line. Both tests are based on the
correlation between the unobservables driving these choices and the unobservables
influencing default. The choice of these tests gives a flavor of the identification strat-
egy that we will rely on in the structural model, explained in Section 4. We run these
tests on the whole sample and for the first loan ever taken, the set of loans that we
will use in the structural estimates.
2.3.1 Demand and Default
We start by investigating whether firms that are more likely to demand credit are
also more likely to default. The CB dataset includes both firms borrowing and not
borrowing, while we only observe default on the loan only for borrowing firms. We
can formalize the problem as a two equations selection model:
di = 1(Xdi β + νi > 0)
fi = 1(X
f
i γ + ηi > 0)
(2.1)
where di is equal to 1 if the firm borrows and fi is equal to one if the borrower is a
defaulter 15 and is observed only if di = 1. This is similar to the classical selection
model analyzed by Heckman [1979], with the only difference that the outcome vari-
able is also binary, rather than being continuous. Adverse selection implies that the
correlation between ν and η is positive. If we estimate a linear probability model
for default, assuming that ν, η are bivariate normal with correlation coefficient ρ, we
can employ the two step procedure of Heckman [1979] by first estimating a probit
on di, and then constructing the Mills ratio and inserting it in the second equation.
A test for a positive correlation between the error terms is a t-test on the coeffi-
cient of the Mills ratio in the default equation. As controls in the default equation
we use firm level characteristics (total assets, share of intangible assets over total
assets, returns on assets, leverage, sales, trade debit, score) as well as sector, year
and area dummies. In the selection equation we add the indicators of local financial
development in 1936 at the regional level collected by Guiso et al. [2004], who show
15 As explained in the data section, we define a firm as defaulter if any of its loans are classified
as bad up to at most 3 years after borrowing.
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that they are good instruments for financial development today while uncorrelated
with current economic performance. They therefore satisfy the condition for a valid
exclusion restriction: they affect the probability of obtaining a loan, which varies
with the degree of local financial development, but are unlikely to be correlated with
the probability of defaulting, conditional on having a loan.16
Results reported in Table 2.2, Panel A, are consistent with the hypothesis
that lending is affected by adverse selection. The coefficient of the Mills ratio is
positive and statistically significant both when considering first loans and all loans.
The magnitude is larger for the second sample, suggesting that adverse selection
issues are not confined to the early phase of the firm’s borrowing cycle.
2.3.2 Loan Size and Default
We then consider the relationship between amount of loan used and default proba-
bility. Differently from the previous subsection, we are not in a selection framework
as the same firms are observed in both equations. Still, the idea is the same, as we
test for a positive correlation between the unobservables that determine the choice of
“coverage” and the occurrence of an “accident”, conditional on several individual char-
acteristics. We consider two dependent variables for coverage: the absolute amount
of credit used as well as the amount of credit used as a share of credit granted. In
our lending context we check if firms that use a larger share of their loans are more
likely to default on them. Adverse selection should imply that riskier firms use more
credit. We set up the following bivariate probit:
`i = 1(Xiβ + εi > 0)
fi = 1(Xiγ + ηi > 0)
(2.2)
where `i is a dummy equal to one if the loan amount used is above the median,
or if the loan amount used over granted is above the median, and fi takes value of
one if the borrower is a defaulter. The vector of controls Xi is composed by year,
area, sector, and bank fixed effects, as well as other firm’s balance sheet variables,
including the score, and the interest rate. We specify the distribution of the residuals
εi, ηi as jointly normal, with a correlation coefficient ρ. Positive and significant ρ
suggests presence of adverse selection. The results of this test are summarized in
Table 2.2 Panel B. The positive correlation is similar for the sample of first loans
and for all loans and for both dependent variables.
16 This instrument is valid for this simplified setup of the reduced form test, but not for the
structural model that we present later, where we need to instrument prices that vary at the bank-
market-year level.
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Table 2.2: Positive Correlation Tests
Panel A: Demand and Default
First All
Selection .131∗∗ .312∗∗∗
(.059) (.023)
Panel B: Loan Size and Default
First All
Used 0.181∗∗∗ 0.170∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003)
Used/Granted 0.196∗∗∗ 0.186∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003)
Note: Panel A reports the selection term of a Heckman selection model. The two columns
report the coefficient on the Mills ratio in a model where the outcome equation (default or
not) is linear. Panel B reports the correlation coefficient of the error terms of a bivariate
probit model. Columns labelled “First” only consider the first loan ever, “All” all loans.
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2.4 The Model
The framework we construct aims at quantifying the effects of asymmetric informa-
tion on the demand for and supply of credit for Italian firms. In order to test for this,
we assume that each firm i = 1, ..., I is willing to invest in a project and is looking for
credit to finance it. Firms decide which bank j = 1, ..., J to borrow from based on
the conditions offered that maximise the expected "profits"17 of their choice. This
determines demand for credit. Conditional on demand, firms decide the amount of
credit to use and whether to default or not. The supply of credit results from banks’
static Bertrand-Nash competition on interest rates.
The theoretical model we develop is based on the following assumptions:
(1) Asymmetric Information: Following Stiglitz and Weiss [1981], we assume
that the asymmetry of information is on the riskiness of the firm, known by
the firm but not by the bank, whereas the distribution of riskiness among all
firms is known by both. We identify this riskiness with the firm’s probability
of default. We let borrowers and lenders be risk neutral.18
(2) First Year of New Loans: We limit our analysis to the first year of newly
granted loans. This is a common assumption in empirical models of insurance
with asymmetric information, starting from Chiappori and Salanié [2000]. This
is done to avoid heterogenous experience ratings among borrowers and loan
renegotiation, as the focus of the paper is on first access to credit.19
(3) Main New Credit Line: We just consider the choice of the main new credit
line that firms open for the first time within our sample. As shown by De-
tragiache et al. [2000], in Italy, multiple relationship banking is widely used
by firms to reduce liquidity risk. However, the share of the main credit line
opened accounts on average for over 70% of the total share of new yearly credit
(both usable and used), justifying the choice of this simplifying assumption.
(4) Posted Interest Rates: We assume that banks have posted interest rates for
types of firms k = 1, ...,K in each market m and period t, depending on the
borrowers’ characteristics. Following the work by Albareto et al. [2011] on the
determinants of interest rates decisions, these types are defined by the amount
17 We will define these profits as utilities later on, to distinguish them from banks’ profits.
18 The assumption of asymmetric information in Stiglitz and Weiss [1981] is that lenders observe
the mean return of a project, but not its riskiness.
19 We relax this assumption in a companion paper (Pavanini and Schivardi [2013]).
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of credit granted, the firm’s sector, the firm’s size in terms of sales, and the
observable riskiness of the firm defined by the SCORE.20
(5) Exogenous Amount of Credit: We limit our analysis to the interest rate
as the only screening device, as in Stiglitz and Weiss [1981]. Therefore, we
assume that the amount of credit granted from bank j to firm i is exogenously
given by the firm’s project requirements, and that the bank just offers a posted
interest rate for that specific amount to each type k in each market m. In a
standard insurance or credit market with asymmetric information, firms are
likely to compete not only on prices, but on other clauses of the contract as
well. In our context, the amount granted could be another dimension over
which banks compete. In a world with lending exclusivity, banks can offer
menus of amounts granted with matched interest rates to reduce the extent of
asymmetric information, for example charging rates that increase more than
proportionally with the amount granted. However, this is the case only with
contract exclusivity, which is not a feature of our setting, where borrowers can
open multiple credit lines with different lenders. Empirical evidence of non-
exclusivity results also from the pricing regression described in Appendix A,
which presents a negative correlation between interest rates and the amount
of credit granted.21 Moreover, the assumption of setting the loan amount as
part of the definition of type is also justified by the distribution of amounts
granted, characterized by a high concentration of loans around some specific
mass points. We also assume no collateral, as the type of loans we analyze are
uncollateralized. We do however allow for an endogenous amount of loan used.
2.4.1 Demand, Loan Size and Default
Given these assumptions, let there be i = 1, ..., I firms of observable type k = 1, ...,K
and j = 1, ..., J banks in m = 1, ...,M markets in period t = 1, ..., T . Let firms have
the following utility from credit, which determines their demand:
UDikjmt = α¯
D
0 + α
D
1 Pjmt +X
′
jmtβ
D + ξDjmt︸ ︷︷ ︸
δDjmt
+σDνi + Y
′
i η
D + γDk︸ ︷︷ ︸
V Di
+εDikjmt. (2.3)
20 The construction of these posted interest rates is described in Appendix A.
21 We thank Pierre-André Chiappori for his suggestions on this point.
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We normalize to zero the utility from the outside option, which is not bor-
rowing. Firms will choose the bank that maximizes their utility, or will choose not
to borrow. Then, conditional on borrowing, they will choose the share of amount
granted to use that maximizes the following utility:
ULikmt = α
L
0 + α
L
1Pjmt +X
′
jmtβ
L + ξLjmt︸ ︷︷ ︸
δLjmt
+Y ′i η
L + γLk︸ ︷︷ ︸
V Li
+εLikmt. (2.4)
Finally, conditional on borrowing, they will choose to default if the following
utility is greater than zero:
UFikmt = α
F
0 + α
F
1 Pjmt +X
′
jmtβ
F + ξFjmt︸ ︷︷ ︸
δFjmt
+Y ′i η
F + γFk︸ ︷︷ ︸
V Fi
+εFikmt. (2.5)
Here Xjmt are banks’ observable attributes, Pjmt are the posted interest rates
mentioned above,22 ξjmt are banks’ unobservable (to the econometrician) attributes,
Yi are firms’ observable characteristics, and γk are types’ fixed effects. We assume
that εDikjmt is distributed as a type 1 extreme value, following the literature on
demand estimation for differentiated products (Berry [1994], Berry et al. [1995]).
We let the random coefficient of the demand’s constant term αD0i = α¯
D
0 +σ
Dνi, with
νi ∼ N(0, 1),23 to be jointly normally distributed with εLikmt, and εFikmt, such that:
 α
D
0
εL
εF
 ∼ N

 α¯
D
0
0
0
 ,
 σ
2D ρDLσ
DσL ρDFσ
DσF
ρDLσ
DσL σ2L ρLFσ
LσF
ρDFσ
DσF ρLFσ
LσF σ2F

 . (2.6)
We interpret a positive correlation between the firm specific unobservables
driving demand and default (ρDF ) as evidence of adverse selection. The intuition
is that if the unobservables that drive demand are positively correlated with the
unobservables that drive default, then riskier firms are more likely to demand. The
idea behind the identification of the correlation between αD0 and εF is the following.
If we observe a firm taking out a loan, while the model tells us that this firm should
be unlikely to take the loan, then this is a "high αD0 " firm. A positive correlation of
22 We explain in Appendix A how we separate the bank-market-period price from the type specific
price.
23 We use 100 Halton draws for simulation. According to Train and Winston [2007], 100 Halton
draws achieve greater accuracy in mixed logit estimations than 1,000 pseudo-random draws.
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αD0 with εF is evidence of adverse selection.
We interpret a positive correlation between the unobservables driving loan
size and default (ρLF ) as other possible evidence of adverse selection. The intuition
is that if the unobservables that drive the choice of how much credit to use are
positively correlated with the unobservables that drive default, then riskier firms will
use more credit. With this definition of adverse selection we are trying to capture
the case in which a risky firm (high εF ), before signing the contract, already knows
that due to its high εL it will use a higher share of the loan. However, our definition
cannot rule out the case in which two ex-ante equally risky firms take the same loan,
and one of them is hit by a negative shock after the contract has been signed. This
shock increases εL for the firm that was hit, forcing it to use more of the loan.24
This identification strategy allows us to recover adverse selection parameters that
are common across banks and markets, not bank or market specific.25
This set up is similar to Einav et al. [2012], but differs in the specification of
the demand utility. In our case, borrowers’ choices follow a multinomial distribution,
instead of a binomial. This raises the issue of correlating residuals from the demand
model, which vary across borrowers and alternatives (i.e. lenders), to the residuals
from the loan size and default models, which instead vary only across borrowers.
We follow the approach of Ackerberg and Botticini [2002] and allow the normally
distributed random coefficient on the constant term to be correlated with the resid-
uals from the loan size and default equations. We argue that this a practical and
intuitive solution, as it simplifies the problem and allows for a correlation between
unobservables only at the level of the borrower. This implies that in the presence of
adverse selection a riskier firm is more likely to demand from any lender, and not
differently across different lenders.
2.4.2 Supply
On the supply side, we let banks set their interest rates competing à la Bertrand
Nash. We assume that bank j’s profits in market m at time t are given by the sum
of the profits made with each subset of its borrowers of types k:
Πjkmt = (Pjkmt −MCjmt)Qjkmt(1− Fjkmt)−MCjmtQjkmtFjkmt
= PjkmtQjkmt(1− Fjkmt)−MCjmtQjkmt,
(2.7)
24 In this case, ρLF could be interpreted as evidence of either adverse selection or moral hazard.
See Abbring et al. [2003] for distinguishing between those sources of asymmetric information.
25 There is not a clear economic interpretation of the correlation between the demand and loan
size unobservables, so at the moment we set it to zero for simplicity.
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where Qjkmt and Fjkmt are bank’s expectation of demand and default. In
particular, Qjkmt is given by the model’s market shares and the expected loan size,
and Fjkmt is the average default rate for the borrowers of type k that bank j lends
to in market m. Pjkmt is the price of the loan (1 + rj). MCjmt are the bank’s
marginal costs, which we assume to be constant at the bank-market-period level.
It is important to note that Fjkmt depends on price through two channels. First,
equation (2.5) allows for a direct impact of the interest rate on default probability.
Second, a higher interest rate also changes the composition of borrowers as stated
in Assumption 1: increasing price increases the conditional expectation of αD0 , as
safer firms are more likely to self-select out of the borrowing pool. If ρDF ≥ 0, this
implies that an increase in prices increases the probability of default of the pool of
borrowers.
The first order conditions of this profit function deliver the following pricing
equation:
Pjkmt =
MCjmt
1− Fjkmt − F ′jkmt
Qjkmt
Q′jkmt︸ ︷︷ ︸
Effective Marginal Costs
−
(1− Fjkmt)QjkmtQ′jkmt
1− Fjkmt − F ′jkmt
Qjkmt
Q′jkmt︸ ︷︷ ︸
Markup
, (2.8)
Note that the equilibrium price depends on what we define as "effective"
marginal costs and on a markup term. F ′jkmt is the derivative of the expected
default rate with respect to prices, and Q′jkmt is the derivative of the market share
with respect to prices. Qjkmt
Q′jkmt
would be the markup in a Bertrand-Nash model with
differentiated products and no asymmetric information. In fact if there was no
default, i.e. Fjkmt = F ′jkmt = 0, we would be back to a standard equilibrium pricing
equation for differentiated firms competing à la Bertrand-Nash as in Berry et al.
[1995]. We will analyze this equilibrium pricing equation in greater detail in the
next section.
2.4.3 Monte Carlo
We construct a simple numerical example to give the intuition underlying the model’s
predictions. We simulate data for the case of a monopoly bank facing i = 1, ..., N
heterogeneous borrowers. For simplicity, we concentrate on adverse selection between
demand and default (ρDF ), setting loan size to 1 and ρDL = ρLF = 0. We keep
this data fixed and vary the number of banks, borrowers’ price sensitivity, and the
extent of asymmetric information, where ρDF < 0 means advantageous selection
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and ρDF > 0 means adverse selection. For each of these cases we compute banks’
equilibrium prices based on our model. Let borrower i have UDij utility from taking
credit from bank j, UDi0 utility from not borrowing, and U
F
i utility from defaulting:
UDij = α0i + α1Pj + ij ,
= α¯0 + σνi + α1Pj + ij ,
UDi0 = i0,
UFi = εi,
(2.9)
where Pj is the interest rate charged by bank j, ij , i0 are distributed as type
1 extreme value, and νi ∼ N(0, 1). We set σ = 2 and α¯0 = 1, and allow αi and εi to
be jointly normally distributed, with correlation coefficient −1 ≤ ρ ≤ 1. We assume
that all the borrowers have the same price sensitivity α1 < 0. Our asymmetric
information assumption implies that a bank doesn’t observe its borrowers’ individual
default probability, but only its distribution. As a consequence, it only offers one
pooling price Pj for everyone. Given this setup, the demand probability will be given
by:
PrDij = Pr(α0i + α1Pj + ij > α0i + α1Ph + ih ∀h 6= j)
=
exp(α0i+α1Pj)
1+
∑
` exp(α0i+α1P`)
= Λ(α0i + α1Pj),
(2.10)
and we will construct banks’ market shares as Sj = 1N
∑
i Pr
D
ij . Conditional
on demand, default probability will follow from Wooldridge [2002] as:
PrF |D=jij = E
[
Pr(F = 1|ν, Pj)|D = j, Pj
]
= 1Λ(α0i+α1Pj)
∫ ∞
−(α0i+α1Pj) Φ
(
ρν
σ2√
1− ρ2
σ2
)
φ(ν)dν,
(2.11)
and we will construct banks’ share of defaulters as Fj = 1Nj
∑
i Pr
F
ij , where
Nj is the number of borrowers of bank j. Given these probabilities and our supply
side model described in equations (3.9) and (3.10), the first order conditions will
deliver the following equilibrium pricing equation for each bank:
P ∗j =
MC
1− Fj − F ′j 1α1(1−Sj)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Effective Marginal Costs
−
(1− Fj) 1α1(1−Sj)
1− Fj − F ′j 1α1(1−Sj)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Markup
, (2.12)
where the first term on the right hand side represents what we define as
"effective" marginal costs (EffMC), and the second term represents the markup
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(MKP). F ′j is the derivative of the expected default rate with respect to prices, and
α1(1−Sj) is the derivative of the market share with respect to prices. For α1 < 0 it
can be shown that the EffMC term is always positive and the markup term is always
negative.
The different effects of these two factors on equilibrium prices is crucial to
understand the interaction between asymmetric information and imperfect competi-
tion. This is displayed in Figures 2.1 and 2.2, where the top graph represents EffMC
above and negative of the markup below, and the bottom graph shows equilibrium
prices for a monopolist bank. We let these three elements vary across different de-
grees of adverse selection, measured by ρ, and competition, measured by α1. This
means that for the moment we are capturing competition versus the outside option,
but we have verified that increasing the number of banks gives the same result.
Looking at Figure 2.1, for a high level of competition (i.e. rightmost point on
the figure) an increase in adverse selection (moving to the northwest) causes EffMC
to increase, whereas for low competition (point closest to the reader, again mov-
ing northwest) they remain relatively constant. The intuition for this result is the
following. Higher adverse selection implies higher correlation between borrowers’
willingness to pay (WTP) and their riskiness. Hence, with strong competition only
firms with high WTP will borrow, whereas with less competition even firms with
low WTP will take credit, lowering the average riskiness of the pool of borrowers.
The opposite happens for the markup curve as we increase adverse selection, be-
cause it remains nearly constant for high competition (leftmost point, moving to
the northeast), but it decreases substantially for a low level of competition (closest
point to the reader, moving to the northeast). What the graph shows in fact is that
both an increase in adverse selection and an increase in competition reduces a bank’s
markup, implying that adverse selection has a mitigating effect on market power.
As shown in Figure 2.2, the combination of these two factors results in a
non-monotonic equilibrium price response to an increase in adverse selection. If on
one hand equilibrium prices rise in a very competitive environment (closest point to
the reader, moving to the northeast), the opposite happens in a concentrated mar-
ket (leftmost point, moving to the northeast). This is because in the first case the
increasing EffMC drive prices up, whereas in the second case the declining markup
drives prices down. More intuitively, in a highly competitive market where banks
have small price-cost margins, higher prices is the only possible response to an in-
crease in adverse selection. However, banks with a higher price-cost margin will
find it more profitable to reduce prices, as this will allow them to lower the average
riskiness to their pool of borrowers.
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Figure 2.1: Adverse Selection vs Imperfect Competition - Effective Marginal Costs,
negative Markups
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Note: The vertical axis shows the value of effective marginal costs and of the negative of the markup.
The left horizontal axis is level of adverse selection, increasing towards left. The right horizontal
axis is the level of price sensitivity (our measure of competition with the outside option), increasing
towards the right.
Figure 2.2: Adverse Selection vs Imperfect Competition - Equilibrium Prices
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Note: The vertical axis shows the level of equilibrium prices. The left horizontal axis is level of price
sensitivity (our measure of competition with the outside option), increasing towards the right. The
right horizontal axis is the level of adverse selection, increasing towards right. The axis definitions
in this figure differ from those in Figure 2.1 to better display the effects in each.
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2.5 Econometric Specification
Following the model presented above, let m = 1, ...,M index a province, t = 1, ..., T
a year, i = 1, ..., I the firm that borrows, and j = 1, ..., Jmt be the bank/loan
identifier in market m at time t. Moreover, let k = 1, ...,K identify the type of
firm that is borrowing. The k index further segments the market, as banks can lend
across all types of firms within the same market, but firms can only borrow at the
interest rate offered to their own type. Let Yi be a vector of firm and firm-bank
specific characteristics (firm’s balance sheet data, firm’s age, and firm’s distance
to the closest branch of each bank), Xjmt a vector of bank-province-year specific
attributes (number of branches in the market, years of presence in the market, bank
fixed effects), and γk types’ fixed effects.
We estimate a system of three equations: demand for credit, amount of loan
used, and default. We use a 2-step method based on maximum simulated likelihood
and instrumental variables (Train [2009]). In the first step we estimate the firm-
level parameters η = {ηD, ηL, ηF }, the types’ fixed effects γk = {γDk , γLk , γFk }, the
correlation coefficients ρ = {ρDF , ρDL, ρLF }, and the covariances σD and σL from the
firms’ choice probabilities.26 We follow Einav et al. [2012], but differ from them as we
estimate demand using a mixed logit with random coefficients, rather than a probit.
We also recover the lender-province-year specific constants δ̂jmt = {δ̂Djmt, δ̂Ljmt, δ̂Fjmt}
using the contraction method introduced by Berry [1994].
The probability that borrower i of type k in market m at time t chooses
lender j is given by:
PrDikjmt =
∫ [ exp(δ̂Djmt(Xjmt, Pjmt, ξDjmt, βD) + V Di (Yi, ηD, γDk ))
1 +
∑
` exp(δ̂
D
`mt(X`mt, P`mt, ξ
D
`mt, β
D) + V Di (Yi, η
D, γDk ))
]
f(αD0i|θ)dαD0i,
(2.13)
where f(αD0i|θ) is the density of αD0i, and θ are the parameters of its distri-
bution that we want to estimate. The estimation of this choice model only provides
the estimates of ηD, γDk , σ
D, but not of the parameters in δD. Looking at the sec-
ond equation, the share of credit used over granted conditional on borrowing, the
26 In this version of the paper we are still not estimating ρDL, which we set to zero, and σD,
which we set to 1. For the second, it is due to the well known identification problem of the standard
deviations of random coefficients in Berry et al. [1995], explained in Berry et al. [2004] and Train
and Winston [2007]. We are working on incorporating second preferred choices into the model to
guarantee better identification and to be able to estimate this parameter.
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probability of observing a utilization of Likmt is given by:
PrL
ikmt,L=L∗|D=1,αD
0i
= Pr(Likmt = δ
L
jmt + V
L
i + ε
L
ikmt|αD0i)
=
∫
1
σ˜
εL
ikmt
|αD
0i
φ
εL
ikmt
|αD
0i
(Likmt−δ̂Ljmt(Xjmt,Pjmt,ξLjmt,βL)−V Li (Yi,ηL,γLk )−µ˜εL
ikmt
|αD
0i
σ˜
εL
ikmt
|αD
0i
)
f(αD0i|θ)dαD0i,
(2.14)
where εLikmt|αD0i ∼ N
(
σLρDLνi︸ ︷︷ ︸
µ˜
εL
ikmt
|αD
0i
, σ2L(1− ρ2DL)︸ ︷︷ ︸
σ˜2
εL
ikmt
|αD
0i
)
where φ is a standard normal pdf. Finally, the probability of default condi-
tional on taking a loan is:
PrF
ikmt,F=1|D=1,αD
0i
,εL
ikmt
=
∫
Φ
εF
ikmt
|αD
0i
,εL
ikmt
[
δ̂Fjmt(Xjmt, Pjmt, ξ
F
jmt, β
F ) + V Fi (Yi, η
F , γFk )− µ˜εF
ikmt
|αD
0i
,εL
ikmt
σ˜
εF
ikmt
|αD
0i
,εL
ikmt
]
f(α
D
0i|θ)dαD0i,
(2.15)
where εFikmt|αD0i, εLikmt ∼ N
(
AσDνi +Bε
L
ikmt︸ ︷︷ ︸
µ˜
εF
ikmt
|αD
0i
,εL
ikmt
, σ2F − (AρDF +BρLF )︸ ︷︷ ︸
σ˜2
εF
ikmt
|αD
0i
,εL
ikmt
)
A = ρDF σ
2L−ρLF ρDL
σ2Dσ2L−ρ2DL
B = −ρDF ρDL+ρLF σ
2D
σ2Dσ2L−ρ2DL
where the residuals εFikmt are conditional on demand and loan amount unob-
servables. Similarly to the demand side, the estimation of these two choice equations,
jointly with the demand one, only delivers the parameters ηL, ηF , γLk , γ
F
k , ρ, σ
L.
In the second step, the estimated constants δ̂jmt are the dependent variables of
instrumental variable regressions that recover the parameters α¯D0 , αD1 , αL0 , αL1 , αF0 , αF1 , βD, βL, βF
of the bank specific attributes Xjmt and prices Pjmt. This second step also controls
for the potential endogeneity bias caused by the correlation between prices and unob-
served (to the econometrician) bank attributes ξjmt = {ξDjmt, ξLjmt, ξFjmt}. Following
Berry [1994], the contraction method on the demand side finds the δD that equate
predicted market shares ŜDjmt to actual market shares S
D
jmt. This iterative process is
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defined by:
δD,r+1jmt = δ
D,r
jmt + ln
(
SDjmt
ŜDjmt(δ
D,r
jmt)
)
. (2.16)
The predicted market shares are defined as ŜDjmt =
∑
i Pr
D
ikjmt/Nmt, where
Nmt are the number of borrowers in market m at time t. Given the value of these
constant terms, the parameters α¯D0 , αD1 , βD are estimated using instrumental vari-
ables:
δDjmt = α¯
D
0 + α
D
1 Pjmt +X
′
jmtβ
D + ξDjmt, (2.17)
with ξDjmt being the mean zero structural econometric error term. Similarly,
the lender-market constants for loan size δLjmt and default δ
F
jmt are estimated using a
nonlinear least squares search routine as in Goolsbee and Petrin [2004], which solves
for:
δLjmt = arg min
δ
∑
j
(
SˆLjmt(η
L, δL)− SLjmt
)2
, (2.18)
δFjmt = arg min
δ
∑
j
(
SˆLjmt(η
F , δF )− SLjmt
)2
, (2.19)
where ŜLjmt, Ŝ
F
jmt and S
L
jmt, S
F
jmt are the predicted and actual shares of loan
sizes and defaults for lender j in marketm at time t. Given the value of these constant
terms, the parameters αL0 , αL1 , βL and αF0 , αF1 , βF are estimated using instrumental
variables:
δLjmt = α
L
0 + α
L
1Pjmt +X
′
jmtβ
L + ξLjmt, (2.20)
δFjmt = α
F
0 + α
F
1 Pjmt +X
′
jmtβ
F + ξFjmt. (2.21)
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2.6 Estimation
Following from section 5, we use the demand, loan size and default probabilities to
construct the simulated maximum likelihood that allows us to recover the parameters
in η, γk, σD, σL, ρ:
logL =
∑
i
log(PrDikjmt)dikjmt+
∑
i∈D
[
log(PrLikmt)+log(Pr
F
ikmt)fikmt+log(1−PrFikmt)(1−fikmt)
]
,
(2.22)
where dikjmt is the dummy for the choice by firm i of type k of bank j in
market m at time t, and fikmt is the dummy identifying its default. In order to
estimate the remaining parameters we need an additional step explained below.
2.6.1 Constructing the Sample
As already mentioned, we focus on the first line of credit that a firm opens (at
least within our dataset), excluding the first year (1988). We do this to concentrate
on new borrowers, where we expect to find stronger asymmetric information, and
because modeling the evolution of the borrower-lender relationship is beyond the
scope of this paper.27 28 Following other papers on Italian local credit markets
(Felici and Pagnini [2008], Bofondi and Gobbi [2006], Gobbi and Lotti [2004]), we
identify banking markets as the Italian provinces, also used by Italian supervisory
authorities as proxies for the local markets for deposits.29 Our markets are then
constructed as province-year combinations. We define the loan size variable as the
share of loan used over loan granted, and define default as an ever default variable,
as explained before.
The observable explanatory variables that determine firm’s demand, loan size
and default choices are firm and bank characteristics, summarized in Table 2.1. In
the first set of regressors we include firms’ fixed assets, the ratio of intangible over
total assets, net worth, trade debit, profits, cash flow, and age, where trade debit
is the debit that the firm has with its suppliers or clients. We also include types’
fixed effects, where a type is defined as a combination of amount granted, sector,
size, and score.30 In the second group we use prices, bank’s share of branches in the
27 We do this in a companion paper Pavanini and Schivardi [2013].
28 A more extensive description of the construction of the sample is in Appendix A.
29 See Pavanini and Schivardi [2013] and Ciari and Pavanini [2013] for a detailed discussion on
the definition of local banking markets in Italy.
30 See the Appendix A for a detailed description of the types.
30
province, number of years the bank had at least one branch in the province, and
bank dummies. We also control for the distance between each firm and the closest
branch of each bank. We provide details on these variables in the appendix. We
motivate the choice of these explanatory variables in Section 6.3.
2.6.2 Identification
The use of instrumental variables in the second step of the estimation aims at cor-
recting the potential endogeneity bias in the price coefficient for the three equations.
The bias derives from the possible correlation between prices Pjmt and unobserved
(to the econometrician) bank-market level characteristics ξjmt. These unobserved
attributes can be thought as the borrowers’ valuation of a banks’ brand, quality,
and credibility, which are assumed to influence borrowers’ demand, loan size, and
default decisions, but are also very likely to be correlated with banks’ interest rates.
Think for example of ξjmt as a banks’ reputation for offering valuable and helpful
assistance to its borrowers in their business projects, which is unobserved to the
econometrician. Borrowers will value this quality when deciding which bank to get
credit from, and they will also be affected in their likelihood of using more or less
credit and of defaulting. Consequently, the bank will be likely to charge a higher
interest rate, given the potentially higher markup that this attribute can provide.
Moreover, assuming default is increasing in interest rates, a good assistance can lower
the borrower’s default probability, allowing banks to charge a higher rate.
To address the simultaneity problem, following Nevo [2001], we include bank
dummies to capture the bank characteristics that do not vary by market (year-
province). This means that the correlation between prices and banks’ nationwide-
level unobserved characteristics is fully accounted for with these fixed effects, and
does not require any instruments. Hence, we can rewrite equation (2.17), and simi-
larly equations (2.20) and (2.21), as:
δDjmt = α¯
D
0 + α
D
1 Pjmt +X
′
jmtβ
D + ξDj + ∆ξ
D
jmt, (2.23)
where ξDj are banks’ fixed effects and ∆ξ
D
jmt are bank-market-time specific
deviations from the national mean valuation of the bank. Therefore, we need to
use instrumental variables to account for the potential correlation between interest
rates and these bank-market-time specific deviations. We argue that a valid instru-
ment is represented by the share of branches in a specific market of merging rival
banks.31 Since mergers only happen in a single year, this accounts to relying on the
31 We experimented also with other instruments, with similar results. In one case we followed the
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across time correlation of prices with changes in concentration among branches at
the market level. The first stage regression shows that this correlation is positive
and significant, implying that greater rivals’ concentration leads to higher interest
rates. We verify empirically the rank condition for instruments’ validity with the
first stage estimates32, showing that the instruments are good predictors of inter-
est rates. We compare OLS and IV second stages, to show how the instruments
lessen the simultaneity bias.33 Last, for the exclusion restriction to hold, we assume
that bank-market-time specific deviations ∆ξDjmt are uncorrelated with the share of
branches of merging rival banks in a market-time combination. We interpret these
deviations, for example, as market specific differences in a bank’s quality with re-
spect to its national average quality. These can be thought as differences in local
managers’ capacities, or in a bank’s management connections with the local indus-
tries and authorities. These factors are likely to influence a bank’s prices in that
local market, but not the merging decision of rivals, which are usually taken at a
national level and are effective across various markets.
2.6.3 Results
The estimates of the structural model are presented in Table 2.3. The three columns
of results refer respectively to the demand, loan size and default equations. The
top part of the table shows the effect of firm characteristics, the middle one the
effect of bank characteristics, and the bottom one shows the correlation coefficients
of interest, i.e. the correlation between unobservables of demand and default (ρDF )
and the correlation between unobservables of loan size and default (ρLF ). We decided
to include those specific firm characteristics to control for different measures of firms’
assets, profitability, debt, age, and distance, and for our definition of observable type.
We chose among the wide set of balance sheet variables running various reduced form
regressions for demand, loan size, and default. We wanted to control for different
measures of firm size, in the form of assets34, but also for some measures of firms’
current performance, in terms of profits and cash flow. We also tried to control for
approach of Nevo [2001] and Hausman and Taylor [1981], which implies instrumenting the prices
charged by a bank j in a market m with the average of the prices that the same bank charges in all
the other markets. We also tried with banks’ expenditure in software per employee, weighted by
the number of branches in a market, and with the sum of rivals’ characteristics, as in Berry et al.
[1995].
32 First stage estimates are reported in Appendix B.
33 OLS and IV second stage estimates are reported in Appendix B.
34 Albareto et al. [2011] describe the importance of firms’ size in the organization of lending in
the Italian banking sector.
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other specific forms of finance that firms have access to, such as debt from suppliers35.
Finally, we computed the firm’s age and the distance between the city council where
the firm is located and the city council where the closest branch of each bank in the
firm’s choice set is located.36 As introduced in the previous sections, we include fixed
effects for the type of the firm as a determinant of the posted prices.37 Following
the survey of Albareto et al. [2011], these types are constructed as the combination
of the firm’s sector (primary, secondary, tertiary), size (sales above or below the
median), riskiness (three risk categories based on the SCORE), and amount granted
(five categories between 0 and 3,000,000 e). We also included the number and the
share of branches that a bank has in a market (province-year), as well as the number
of years that it has been in the market. We have data on branches from 1959, so
we can observe banks’ presence in each council for the 30 years before the beginning
of our loan sample. These variables aim at capturing the level of experience that a
bank has in a market, as well as the density of its network of branches with respect
to its competitors, which can both be relevant features influencing firms’ decisions.
The estimates present evidence of asymmetric information, both in terms
of the correlation between demand and default unobservables and loan size and
default unobservables. This confirms the results of the the reduced form test that
we presented earlier. Looking at the demand side, we find that distance and prices
have a negative impact on demand, as expected. In general, it seems that firms with
more net worth, cash flow and trade debit are less likely to demand credit, but firms
with more fixed assets and profits are more likely to borrow. Older firms are also
less likely to demand. Firms seem to favor banks with a higher share of branches,
but are less likely to demand form banks with longer experience in a market. This
might be because the sample we are considering is of new borrowers, which might
be perceived as more risky by experienced banks. Hence, these firms are more likely
to get better conditions from less experienced banks. The share of loan used seems
to follow the same logic as demand for fixed assets and ratio of intangible assets,
as well as profits, cash flow, interest rates and share of branches. Differently from
demand, the share of loan used over granted is increasing in the distance from the
branch firms are borrowing from. For what concerns the default probability, this
35 Petersen and Rajan [1995] use the amount of trade credit as a key variable to determine if
borrowers are credit constrained, as it’s typically a more expensive form of credit than banks’ credit
lines.
36 It is important to include distance as Degryse and Ongena [2005] show empirical evidence, using
Belgian data, that in lending relationship transportation costs cause spatial price discrimination.
They find that loan rates decrease with the distance between the borrower and the lender, and
increase with the distance between the borrower and the competing lenders.
37 See Appendix A for a detailed description of how we construct types.
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is negatively influenced by more assets, cash flow and trade debit, but positively
affected by net worth, profits, and firm’s age. As expected, higher interest rates
increase default probability.
The mean of own and cross price elasticities for the main 5 banks in the
sample are reported in Table 2.4. We find that on average a 1% increase in interest
rate reduces a bank’s own market share by over 2%, and increases competitor banks’
shares by about 0.2%.
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Table 2.3: Structural Estimates
Variables Demand Loan Size Default
Assets

Fixed Assets 0.197∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗ -0.026∗∗
(0.017) (0.007) (0.009)
Intangible/Total Assets 1.352∗∗∗ 2.001∗∗∗ -1.189∗∗∗
(0.429) (0.123) (0.211)
Net Worth -0.370∗∗∗ 0.021 0.116∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.016) (0.016)
Profitability

Profits 0.623∗∗∗ 0.040∗∗∗ 0.167∗∗∗
(0.036) (0.016) (0.014)
1st Stage Cash Flow -0.327∗∗∗ -0.049∗∗∗ -0.451∗∗∗
Firm Level (0.028) (0.015) (0.027)
Debt
{
Trade Debit -0.692∗∗∗ 0.003 -0.116∗∗∗
(0.044) (0.018) (0.023)
Others

Firm’s Age -0.798∗∗∗ -0.036 0.131∗∗∗
(0.050) (0.029) (0.014)
Distance -5.481∗∗∗ 0.088∗∗ -0.020
(0.257) (0.037) (0.019)
Type FE Yes Yes Yes
Interest Rate -3.669∗∗∗ -0.295∗∗∗ 2.387∗∗∗
(0.348) (0.097) (0.389)
Number of Branches -2.746∗∗∗ -0.102 -0.236
2nd Stage (0.269) (0.075) (0.300)
Bank Level Share of Branches 12.646∗∗∗ 0.429∗∗ 0.098
(0.721) (0.201) (0.805)
Years in Market -1.001∗∗∗ -0.032 -0.124
(0.172) (0.048) (0.193)
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes
Adverse Selection
Demand-Default ρDF 0.304
∗∗∗
(0.006)
Loan Size-Default ρLF 0.159
∗∗∗
(0.001)
Obs 301,334 7,170 7,170
Note: Standard errors in brackets. ∗ is significant at the 10% level, ∗∗ at the 5% level, and ∗ ∗ ∗ at
the 1% level.
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Table 2.4: Mean across Markets of Own and Cross Price Elasticities for Main Banks
Banks Bank 1 Bank 2 Bank 3 Bank 4 Bank 5
Bank 1 -2.635 0.133 0.206 0.168 0.136
Bank 2 0.164 -2.394 0.163 0.164 0.154
Bank 3 0.261 0.258 -2.662 0.276 0.257
Bank 4 0.202 0.171 0.234 -2.562 0.162
Bank 5 0.184 0.161 0.183 0.174 -2.734
Note: These are the first 5 banks in terms of national market shares. Elasticities are interpreted
as the percentage change in market shares in response to a 1% increase in prices.
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2.7 Counterfactuals
We run a counterfactual policy experiment to quantify the effects of asymmetric in-
formation, as well as to understand the relationship between asymmetric information
and imperfect competition. We simulate an increase in adverse selection, and ana-
lyze the consequence of this change on equilibrium prices, quantities, and defaults.
An increase in adverse selection captures the idea that during a financial crisis in-
vestment opportunities contract for all firms, but risky firms will be more exposed
than safer ones, demanding more credit. We simulate this scenario doubling the
estimated correlation coefficients. Once we recover the new equilibrium outcomes of
interest in the new scenario, we investigate whether the variations that we observe
from the baseline model are correlated with various measures of competition in the
different local markets.
In this counterfactual exercise we follow the example of Nevo [2000] and
recover each bank’s marginal costs using the pricing equation (3.10):
M̂Cjmt = Pjmt
[
1− Fjmt − F ′jmt
Qjmt
Q′jmt
]
+
(1− Fjmt)QjmtQ′jmt
1− Fjmt − F ′jmt QjmtQ′jmt
(2.24)
Under the assumption of marginal costs being the same in each scenario, we
re-calculate banks’ market shares, loan sizes and defaults with the counterfactual
level of adverse selection, and derive the new equilibrium prices as:
P˜jmt =
M̂Cjmt
1− F˜jmt − F˜ ′jmt Q˜jmtQ˜′jmt
−
(1− F˜jmt) Q˜jmt
Q˜′jmt
1− F˜jmt − F˜ ′jmt Q˜jmtQ˜′jmt
, (2.25)
where Q˜jmt and F˜jmt are the new equilibrium quantities and defaults under
the counterfactual scenario. Following the non-monotonic price response predicted
in the Monte Carlo experiment, we investigate what happens to equilibrium prices
in this counterfactual scenario with respect to the actual prices. As shown in Figure
2.3, we find that almost all the prices vary, with the majority increasing by up to
5% (with some outliers not included in this figure), but some of them decreasing
by at most 5%. We relate this price variation38 to a measure of bank-province-
year specific market power, which is the predicted markup derived from the demand
38 We measure price variation as: ∆Pjmt =
P˜jmt−Pjmt
Pjmt
.
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model, i.e. the last term in equation (2.24).39 We present this relationship in Figure
2.4, where we show evidence of a negative and statistically significant correlation
between market power and price variation.40 This means that prices increase in
more competitive markets and decrease in more concentrated ones, confirming the
predictions of the model.
We also look at the variation in quantities in the counterfactual scenario. We
focus on the change in the share of borrowing firms41 due to an increase in adverse
selection. As shown in Figure 2.5, similarly to the price variation, we find that the
share of borrowing firms varies in both direction, both increasing and decreasing.
When we regress this share variation on the average markup at the province-year
level, we find a positive and significant coefficient, presented in Figure 2.6. This
suggests that the share of borrowing firms increases in more concentrated markets,
as a natural consequence of the price reduction.
Last, we consider the effect of an increase in adverse selection on the aver-
age default rates42 that a bank faces in a province-year. Figure 2.7 confirms that
again most of the defaults are unchanged, but that a fraction of the banks in some
provinces-years experiences either an increase or a reduction in borrowers’ defaults.
When we investigate the relationship between changes in default rates and markups,
shown in Figure 2.8, we find that banks with a higher markup tend to reduce their
default rates. This is the effect of the reduction in prices, which on one side attracts
safer borrowers, and on the other reduces the probability of default of borrowers,
given the estimated positive and significant effect of interest rates on defaults in
Table 2.3.
39 We use the markup estimated in the baseline model. We tried also with other measures of
competition at the local market level, like HHI of branches and loans, with similar results.
40 We run a regression of bank-province-year level price variation on bank-province-year level
markup, controlling for province-year fixed effects, and find a negative and significant coefficient.
41 We measure this as the variation in the sum of the shares of the inside goods: ∆
∑
j Sjmt =∑
j S˜jmt −
∑
j Sjmt
42 We measure default rates’ variation as: ∆Fjmt = F˜jmt − Fjmt
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Figure 2.3: Kernel Density of Price Variations
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Note: The vertical axis is the density. The horizontal axis is the percentage variation between
actual and counterfactual prices.
Figure 2.4: Regression of Price Variation on Markup
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Note: The vertical axis is the percentage variation between actual and counterfactual prices. The
horizontal axis is the bank-province-year level measure of markup.
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Figure 2.5: Kernel Density of Quantity Variations
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Note: The vertical axis is the density. The horizontal axis is the variation between actual and
counterfactual share of the borrowing firms in each province-year in percentage points.
Figure 2.6: Regression of Quantity Variation on Markup
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Note: The vertical axis is the variation between actual and counterfactual share of the borrowing
firms in each province-year in percentage points. The horizontal axis is the percentage variation
between actual and counterfactual prices.
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Figure 2.7: Kernel Density of Default Variations
0
1
2
3
D
en
si
ty
−1 −.5 0 .5 1
%−Point Change in Bank−Market−Year Defaulters
Note: The vertical axis is the density. The horizontal axis is the variation between actual and
counterfactual default rates in percentage points.
Figure 2.8: Regression of Default Variation on Markup
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points. The horizontal axis is the bank-province-year level measure of markup.
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2.8 Conclusion
In this paper we analyzed the interaction between imperfect competition and asym-
metric information in the Italian market for small business lines of credit. We have
access to a rich dataset with detailed information about credit line contracts be-
tween firms and banks, including all the main Italian credit institutions and a highly
representative sample of firms. Using this data, we provide reduced form evidence
of adverse selection in the spirit of the positive correlation test on unobservables by
Chiappori and Salanié [2000]. We find stronger presence of asymmetric information
for new borrowers.
Based on this evidence, we propose a structural model of firms’ demand for
credit, loan use, and default, as well as of banks’ pricing. We let differentiated banks
compete à la Bertrand-Nash on interest rates in local credit markets, but also use
interest rates as a screening device, as in Stiglitz and Weiss [1981]. The model allows
for imperfect competition in the lending market, accounting for asymmetric informa-
tion between borrowers and lenders. We assume in fact that firms know the riskiness
of their own project, but banks can only observe the average riskiness of their borrow-
ers, conditional on observable firm characteristics. When we introduce asymmetric
information, our model of oligopolistic competition predicts different banks’ interest
rate reactions, depending on the level of competition. We provide Monte Carlo ev-
idence of a non-monotonic optimal bank’s price response to an increase in adverse
selection, depending on different measures of competition. More adverse selection
causes prices to increase in competitive markets, but can have the opposite effect in
more concentrated ones, where banks can leverage over their markup to lower prices
and attract safer borrowers.
We find evidence of adverse selection in the data, both in the form of a positive
correlation between unobservables determining demand and default, and unobserv-
ables affecting the size of the loan and default. We conduct a policy experiment to
simulate the effects of a credit crunch, in which risky firms experience a more severe
financial distress and demand more credit, doubling adverse selection. As predicted,
in this counterfactual scenario equilibrium prices rise for more competitive markets
and decline for more concentrated ones. Moreover, the share of borrowing firms
increases in more concentrated markets, and default rates fall.
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2.9 Appendix A - Constructing the Dataset
We have assembled various datasets from different sources, which are the following:
• Firm Data: Dataset from Centrale dei Bilanci with yearly (1988-1998) bal-
ance sheet data for each firm, including both firms that take credit and don’t
(outside option). This also includes the year of birth of each firm and its
location at the city council level.
• Score Data: Dataset for each firm with yearly (1982-1998) score data, with
also the 6 years preceding 1988. We retain from this data the 1982-1987 av-
erage, standard deviation, and weighted average (more weight to more recent
years) of the score.
• Loan Data: Dataset from Centrale dei Rischi with yearly (1988-1998) firm-
bank loan contracts, including amount granted, amount used, interest rate,
firm’s default. This is only for the main 94 banks and for short term credit
lines.
• Bank Data: Dataset with yearly (1988-2002) balance sheet data for each
bank, including yearly total loans that each bank gives in each province, and
its share of the total loans granted in each province.
• Branch Data: Dataset with yearly (1959-2005) branches for each bank at the
city council level. This includes the population of banks (∼ 1,500 banks).
• Coordinates Data: Based on the ISTAT city council classification, we assign
to each city council the geographic coordinates that will allow us to calculate
firm-branch distances.
We first merge the firm and score datasets with the loan data, in order to
have all the borrowing and not borrowing firms together. We then take all the
banks actively lending in each province and assume that those represent the choice
set for each firm, regardless of whether they have a branch in that province or not
43. We assume that each firm chooses one main credit line among all the banks
available in its province. The main line is defined as the line for which the amount
used, regardless of the amount granted, is the highest. For cases in which multiple
43 There is evidence in other papers (Bofondi and Gobbi [2006]), as well as in our data, that a
few banks lend in some provinces even if they don’t have a branch there.
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lines have the same amount used, then the one with the lowest price is chosen. We
calculate the distance in km between the city council of each firm and the city council
where each bank from the choice set has a branch using the geographic coordinates.
For each firm-bank pair, we only keep the branch that is closest to the firm.
2.9.1 Predicting Prices and Amounts Granted
We only consider the first year in which a firm appears in our sample. We assume that
banks have a posted price for each observable type of firm in each market, defined
as a year-province combination. We recover this synthetic price using regression
analysis based on the actual prices that we observe.44 We need to do this to predict
the price that would have been offered to firms not borrowing in the data, as well as
the price that would have been offered to borrowing firms by banks other than the
chosen one. For this reason, we use not only the interest rate charged for the main
credit line, but also the rates for the other lines that a firm opens in its first year.
We run the following OLS regression:
Pikjmt = α̂+ λ̂jmt︸ ︷︷ ︸
P˜jmt
+ ω̂k︸︷︷︸
∆˜Pk
+εikjmt, (2.26)
where Pikjmt is the interest rate that bank j charges to firm i of type k
in market m at time t, λjmt is a bank-market-time interactive fixed effect and ωk
are interactive type dummies. We define an observable type based on the amount
granted, the sector, the size in terms of sales, and the observable riskiness (SCORE).
The underlying assumption here is that the effect on prices of the observable type’s
characteristics is additively separable with respect to the bank-market effect. Table
2.5 summarizes all the categories that define a type, as well as some interest rate
descriptives for each value of these categories. This regression allows us to recover the
bank-market-time specific average price P˜jmt, as well as the type specific deviation
from this average ∆˜P k. Given the large number of variables estimated, we don’t
report the results of the regression.45 However, given that in the estimation we will
use only the bank-market-time specific average prices, we present some descriptive
statistics comparing the predicted prices P˜jmt with the actual prices Pjmt in the data
in Table 2.6, as well as two overlapping kernel densities in Figure 2.9, to show the
goodness of fit of the model.
We are mainly interested in prices at the bank-market level because we use
44 We are working on alternative ways of predicting prices, following Gerakos and Syverson [2014].
45 We find that the bank-market-time fixed effects as well as the types’ fixed effects are jointly
significant, and the R2 is 0.5092.
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this variable only in the second stage of our estimation. We provide the intuition of
our approach with a simplified version of the demand model. Let the utility of firm
i of type k in market m at time t to choose bank j be:
Uikjmt = δjmt + γk + εikjmt, (2.27)
in the first stage of our estimation we recover δ̂jmt and γ̂k, that are bank-
market fixed effects and types’ fixed effects, which in the second stage are used to
derive the price coefficients. We are just interested in the price coefficient at the
bank-market-time level, and the price variation at the type level will be captured by
γk, so we will only run the following second stage:
δ̂jmt = α0 + α1P˜jmt + βXjmt + ξjmt. (2.28)
Similarly to the price, we also need to predict what the amount granted
would be for firms that don’t borrow. We do so using regression analysis from the
borrowing firms. This is simplified by the fact that the distribution of amounts
granted among the borrowing firms shows evident mass points corresponding to
round numbers (mostly between 50 and 500 thousands euros), which are strongly
correlated with several firm characteristics (for example, bigger firms get a greater
amount). Given that we just need one amount granted for each non-borrowing firm,
we calculate the median amount granted to each firm in our data, and group the
resulting amounts in the 5 categories listed in Table 2.5. We regress them against
several firm level controls46 and a province-year-sector interactive fixed effect. The
model predictions compared to the actual amounts are shown in Table 2.7. The
model performs relatively well for the most demanded amounts (between 50 and 500
thousand euros), but performs poorly for the least demanded ones (below 50 and
above 500 thousands).
46 Tangible and intangible assets, total assets, net assets, short term debt, sales, profits, cashflow,
SCORE, long term and short term total bank debt, returns on assets, age of the firm.
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Table 2.5: Types’ Summary Statistics
Category Interest Rate
Obs Percent Mean Median Std. Dev.
Amount Granted 0 - 50,000 12,135 12.16 16.75 16.34 4.70
50,001 - 100,000 17,014 17.05 15.60 15.19 4.24
100,001 - 200,000 22,823 22.87 14.65 14.26 3.92
200,001 - 500,000 27,440 27.50 13.81 13.39 3.67
500,001 - 3,000,000 20,363 20.41 12.45 12.15 3.35
Sector Primary 17,076 17.11 14.30 13.70 4.29
Secondary 42,775 42.87 14.53 14.01 4.17
Tertiary 39,924 40.01 14.27 13.73 4.01
Size Small 40,223 40.31 15.45 14.95 3.93
Large 59,552 59.69 13.67 13.07 4.11
SCORE Low Risk 25,684 25.74 13.95 13.32 4.28
Medium Risk 33,659 33.73 14.20 13.72 4.09
High Risk 40,432 40.52 14.82 14.3 4.02
Total 99,775 100.00 14.39 13.82 4.13
Note: Interest rates is winsorized for the top and bottom 1% of its distribution. We exclude
loans above 3,000,000 euros, which represent 2.5% of the loans in our sample. Primary sector in-
cludes primary, minerals’ extraction, chemicals, metals, energy. Secondary sector includes food and
beverages, textile and clothing, wood, paper and publishing, mechanical and electronic machines,
production of transport vehicles, other manufacturing, and constructions. Tertiary sector includes
commerce of transport vehicles, other commerce, hotels and restaurants, transport, storing and
communications, real estate, financial intermediaries, and public administration. Size is defined
as firms above or below the median of the distribution of yearly sales, which is around 10 million
euros. Low risk is for SCORE values between 1 and 4, medium risk between 5 and 6, and high risk
7 to 9.
Table 2.6: Descriptives Comparing Actual and Predicted Prices
Statistics Actual Price Predicted Price
Mean 16.594 16.592
Standard Deviation 2.579 2.579
10th Percentile 13.400 13.399
50th Percentile 16.500 16.500
90th Percentile 19.954 19.954
Correlation Coefficient 1.000∗∗∗
P-Value 0.000
Note: These are average prices at the year-province-bank level for the types’ default categories:
0-50,000 euros, primary sector, small size, low risk.
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Figure 2.9: Kernel Densities Comparing Actual and Predicted Prices
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Table 2.7: Percentage of Predictions and Actual Amounts Granted in Thousands of
Euros
Actual
Predicted 0 - 50 51 - 100 101 - 200 201 - 500 501 - 3,000 Total
0 - 50 2.6 1.7 0.4 0.1 0.0 0.72
51 - 100 23.7 18.6 10.9 4.5 1.2 10.19
101 - 200 63.3 65.8 66.6 59.6 40.0 59.90
201 - 500 10.4 13.9 22.1 35.8 58.2 29.08
501 - 3,000 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.11
Total 5,667 11,222 15,580 17,301 9,268 59,038
Note: Each column sums up to 100%. The last column on the right represents the predicted total
number of observations for each mass point, whereas the last row represents the actual total number
of observations for each mass point.
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2.10 Appendix B - IV First Stage and OLS vs IV Second
Stage
Table 2.8: IV First Stage and OLS vs IV Second Stage for Demand
First Stage Second Stage
Variable Interest Rate OLS IV
Share of Branches of Merging Rivals 0.215∗∗∗ - -
(0.021)
Interest Rate - 4.506∗∗∗ -3.669∗∗∗
(0.303) (0.348)
Number of Branches -0.014 -2.766∗∗∗ -2.746∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.233) (0.269)
Share of Branches 0.200∗∗∗ 11.497∗∗∗ 12.646∗∗∗
(0.043) (0.627) (0.721)
Years in Market -0.030∗∗∗ -0.799∗∗∗ -1.001∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.150) (0.172)
Constant 0.801∗∗∗ -2.111∗∗∗ 4.580∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.306) (0.352)
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes
Obs 2,279 2,279 2,279
R2 0.2028 0.2943 -
F-Stat 97.606 - -
Note: Standard errors in brackets. ∗ is significant at the 10% level, ∗∗ at the 5% level, and ∗ ∗ ∗ at
the 1% level.
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Table 2.9: IV First Stage and OLS vs IV Second Stage for Loan Size
First Stage Second Stage
Variable Interest Rate OLS IV
Share of Branches of Merging Rivals 0.215∗∗∗ - -
(0.021)
Interest Rate - 0.030 -0.295∗∗∗
(0.097) (0.097)
Number of Branches -0.014 -0.103 -0.102
(0.016) (0.075) (0.075)
Share of Branches 0.200∗∗∗ 0.383∗ 0.429∗∗
(0.043) (0.200) (0.201)
Years in Market -0.030∗∗∗ -0.024 -0.032
(0.010) (0.048) (0.048)
Constant 0.801∗∗∗ 0.070 0.337∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.098) (0.098)
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes
Obs 2,279 2,279 2,279
R2 0.2028 0.0425 -
F-Stat 97.606 - -
Note: Standard errors in brackets. ∗ is significant at the 10% level, ∗∗ at the 5% level, and ∗ ∗ ∗ at
the 1% level.
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Table 2.10: IV First Stage and OLS vs IV Second Stage for Default
First Stage Second Stage
Variable Interest Rate OLS IV
Share of Branches of Merging Rivals 0.215∗∗∗ - -
(0.021)
Interest Rate - -0.283 2.387∗∗∗
(0.384) (0.389)
Number of Branches -0.014 -0.230 -0.236
(0.016) (0.297) (0.300)
Share of Branches 0.200∗∗∗ 0.473 0.098
(0.043) (0.796) (0.805)
Years in Market -0.030∗∗∗ -0.190 -0.124
(0.010) (0.191) (0.193)
Constant 0.801∗∗∗ -0.727∗ -2.913∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.389) (0.393)
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes
Obs 2,279 2,279 2,279
R2 0.2028 0.1740 -
F-Stat 97.606 - -
Note: Standard errors in brackets. ∗ is significant at the 10% level, ∗∗ at the 5% level, and ∗ ∗ ∗ at
the 1% level.
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Abstract
Asymmetric information is a potential determinant of market structure in the bank-
ing industry. When incumbents have an informational advantage over potential
entrants, entry can be less profitable and concentration may arise. Incumbent banks
can gain an informational advantage in a market by accumulating experience over
time, through learning about the market and building relationships with the borrow-
ers. However, the cost of learning depends on the quality of the pool of borrowers
that the bank lends to. This paper wants to quantify the cost of asymmetric informa-
tion as an entry barrier in the Italian market of credit lines to small businesses. We
do so measuring welfare under different counterfactual scenarios, with and without
borrower-lender asymmetric information and reducing incumbents’ informational ad-
vantage. First, we provide reduced form evidence of learning by branching, showing
that banks improve the quality of their borrowers as they accumulate experience
over the years. We also show that entry is negatively correlated with concentration
of experience. Given this, we estimate a dynamic structural game of banks’ entry,
exit and investment with learning by branching based on Weintraub et al. [2008b],
together with a static framework of firms’ demand for credit, loan size, default and
banks’ pricing, that allows us to identify the effect of asymmetric information on
market structure.
3.1 Introduction
Asymmetric information is a potential determinant of market structure in the bank-
ing industry. When incumbents have an informational advantage over potential
entrants, entry can be less profitable and concentration may arise. Incumbent banks
can gain an informational advantage in a market by accumulating experience over
time, through learning about the market and building relationships with the borrow-
ers. However, the cost of learning depends on the quality of the pool of borrowers
that the bank lends to. For a new entrant, the creditworthiness of its borrowers
will be influenced by the informational advantage that the incumbent banks have.
This paper wants to determine the cost of asymmetric information as an entry bar-
rier in the Italian market of credit lines to small businesses. We do so measuring
welfare under different counterfactual scenarios, with and without borrower-lender
asymmetric information and reducing incumbents’ informational advantage.
Several papers in the banking literature analyse the effects of asymmetric
information on competition and market structure. In the context of incumbent
banks more informed than potential entrants, the equilibrium results found are block-
aded entry (Dell’Ariccia et al. [1999]), a finite number of banks (Dell’Ariccia [2000],
Dell’Ariccia [2001]), and larger adverse selection cost for entrants (Marquez [2002]).
Petersen and Rajan [1995] argue that credit market competition with asymmetric
information may be inimical to the formation of relationships between firms and
banks. Pagano and Jappelli [1993] show that lenders’ incentives to share informa-
tion about borrowers are reduced by the fear of competition by potential entrants.
Broecker [1990] finds an oligopoly result when banks compete on interest rates us-
ing imperfect and independent test of borrowers’ creditworthiness. The empirical
literature provides some evidence of higher loan default rates for new entrants, using
data of the US (Shaffer [1998]) and Italy (Bofondi and Gobbi [2006]). Additionally,
Gobbi and Lotti [2004] show that incumbents have an informational advantage over
new entrants in the Italian credit market.
An intuitive way for lenders to overcome informational asymmetries and the
inefficiencies these might cause is to learn about their borrowers. However, learning
also generates an informational advantage for experienced incumbent lenders versus
potential entrants. Following this direction, some of the theoretical papers in this
strand of literature introduce the concept of learning by lending, which can justify
the endogenous creation of an informational advantage for incumbents (Dell’Ariccia
[2000], Dell’Ariccia [2001]). This idea is borrowed from an earlier literature on the
strategic implications of learning by doing. Based on the seminal papers by Arrow
[1962] and Spence [1981], Dasgupta and Stiglitz [1988] find that learning acts as
an entry barrier, whereas Cabral and Riordan [1994] show that learning leads to
increasing dominance by incumbents. More recently, Besanko et al. [2010] developed
a general model of dynamic competition based on Ericson and Pakes [1995] that
accounts for learning by doing and organisational forgetting, and find that these
forces can deliver varying degrees of long-run industry concentration. There is also
a recent growing interest in structural IO models that allow to recover learning and
forgetting parameters (Benkard [2000], Benkard [2004]).
In this paper we try to capture these effects estimating a dynamic structural
model of banks’ entry, exit and investment through branching. Together with a
companion framework estimating a static model of firms’ demand for credit, loan
size, default, and banks’ pricing (Crawford et al. [2013]), we identify the effect of
asymmetric information on market structure. Given the large number of banks
in each market, and the nonstationary environment that we face after branching
deregulation, we adopt the nonstationary oblivious equilibrium notion developed
by Weintraub et al. [2008b] and Weintraub et al. [2008a]. We estimate this model
using a unique set of linked datasets of the Italian market for small business lines
of credit. We consider the period 1988-1998, right after entry deregulation, during
which there were substantial changes in concentration and market structure of local
credit markets. We provide reduced form evidence of learning by branching, showing
that banks improve the quality of their borrowers as they accumulate experience over
the years. We also show that entry is negatively correlated with concentration of
incumbents’ experience, and that exit is negatively correlated with a bank’s own
experience level.
The contribution of this paper is twofold. On one hand, it contributes to
the structural IO and empirical banking literature developing a dynamic game of
banks’ entry and exit that, differently from existing papers (de Elejalde [2012]), al-
lows for pricing competition and investment in branching. On the other, it provides
a new empirical insight on the effects of asymmetric information on market struc-
ture, that so far have mostly been investigated from a theoretical and reduced form
perspective. The paper is organized as follows. We present the data and the institu-
tional background in Section 2, descriptives and reduced form evidence of learning
by branching, entry and exit in Section 3, the structural model in Section 4, the
estimation methodology in Section 5, counterfactuals in Section 6, and then the
conclusions.
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3.2 Data and Institutional Details
We have access to a unique dataset of small business credit lines, previously used
in Panetta et al. [2009]. We use three main sources of data. Interest rate data and
data on outstanding loans are from the Italian Centrale dei Rischi, or Central Credit
Register. Firm-level balance sheet data are from the Centrale dei Bilanci database.
Banks’ balance-sheet and income-statement data are from the Banking Supervision
Register at the Bank of Italy. By combining these data, we obtain a matched panel
dataset of borrowers and lenders extending over an eleven-year period, between 1988
and 1998.
The Central Credit Register (hereafter CR) is a database that contains de-
tailed information on all individual bank loans extended by Italian banks. Banks
must report data at the individual borrower level on the amount granted and ef-
fectively utilized for all loans exceeding a given threshold 1, with a breakdown by
type of the loan (credit lines, financial and commercial paper, collateralized loans,
medium and long-term loans and personal guarantees). In addition, a subgroup of
around 90 banks (accounting for more than 80 percent of total bank lending) have
agreed to file detailed information on the interest rates they charge to individual
borrowers on each type of loan. Summary statistics for these banks are reported in
Panel A of Table 3.1.
We restrict our attention to short-term credit lines, which have ideal features
for our analysis. First, the bank can change the interest rate at any time, while
the borrower can close the credit line without notice. This means that differences
between the interest rates on loans are not influenced by differences in the matu-
rity of the loan. Second, the loan contracts included in the CR are homogeneous
products (for example, they are not collateralized), so that they can be meaningfully
compared across banks and firms. Third, short term bank loans are the main source
of borrowing of Italian firms. For example, in 1994 they represented 53 percent of
the total debts according to the Flow of Funds data. We define the interest rate as
the ratio of the payment made in each year by the firm to the bank to the average
amount of the loan. The interest payment includes the fixed expenses charged by
the bank to the firm (e.g. which encompass the cost of opening the credit line or the
cost of mailing the loan statement).
The Centrale dei Bilanci (hereafter CB) collects yearly data on the balance
sheets and income statements of a sample of about 35,000 Italian non-financial and
non-agricultural firms. This information is collected and standardized by a con-
1 The threshold was 41,000 euros (U.S. $42,000) until December 1995 and 75,000 euros thereafter.
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sortium of banks interested in pooling information about their customers. A firm
is included in the CB sample if it borrows from at least one of the banks in the
consortium. The database is fairly representative of the Italian non-financial sec-
tor. The firms in the CB sample represent about 49.4% of the total sales reported
in the national accounting data for the Italian non-financial, non-agricultural sec-
tor. Table 3.1, Panel B reports descriptive statistics for the sample of borrowing
and non-borrowing firms. These two groups of firms appear to be fairly similar in
terms of size, leverage and riskiness, but as expected borrowing firms have a higher
share of short term debt compared to non-borrowing ones. The unique feature of
the CB data set is that, unlike other widely used data sets on individual companies
(such as the Compustat database of US companies), it has wide coverage of small
and medium companies; moreover, almost all the companies in the CB sample are
unlisted. The coverage of these small firms makes the data set particularly well
suited for our analysis, because informational asymmetries are potentially strongest
for these firms.
In addition to collecting the data, the CB computes an indicator of the risk
profile of each firm (which we refer to in the remainder of this paper as the SCORE).
The SCORE represents our measure of a firm’s observable default risk. It takes
values from 1 to 9 and is computed annually using discriminant analysis based on a
series of balance sheet indicators (assets, rate of return, debts etc.) according to the
methodology described in Altman [1968] and Altman et al. [1994].
3.2.1 Local Credit Markets
Following other papers on Italian local credit markets (Felici and Pagnini [2008],
Bofondi and Gobbi [2006], Gobbi and Lotti [2004]), we identify banking markets
as the Italian provinces. As for many other industries, there is no clear consensus
on what should be the most appropriate market definition. What is known from
the seminal work of Bresnahan and Reiss [1991] is that local markets should be
independent and isolated. This is explained in more detail for the banking sector
by Cohen and Mazzeo [2007], who claim that in a local banking market consumers
should not typically use depository institutions outside of their area, and that distinct
or overlapping submarkets should not exist within the defined geographic markets.
Claiming that Italian provinces are independent and isolated markets according to
the definition of Cohen and Mazzeo [2007] is a strong assumption. However, limiting
the analysis to small isolated markets would substantially hamper the welfare and
policy implications of our analysis. Moreover, provinces are also used by Italian
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supervisory authorities as proxies for the local markets for deposits.2
We define entry as the act of starting to lend in a geographic market, regard-
less of whether the bank has an established branch or not, and define exit similarly.
Table 3.2 shows summary statistics on local credit markets. On average, there are
2 new banks entering every period in every market, and 1.6 banks exiting. The
substantial turnaround that we observe in the data during these years is the effect
of the entry deregulation at the end of the 1980s, after a long period of geographic
and scope restrictions for Italian banks, as documented in Guiso et al. [2007]. In
particular, right before deregulation in 1985 Italy had only 0.23 branches per 1,000
inhabitants, whereas the EU average was more than double (0.52 per 1,000 inhabi-
tants), despite the Italian economy being very close to the main European economies
in terms of GDP per capita in those years.3 Moreover, by 1995 Italy experienced
a 78.3% growth rate in the number of branches per 1,000 inhabitants, compared to
the EU average growth rate of -5.6%.4
According to the definition of the US department of Justice 5, on average these
markets are moderately concentrated, with the top 10% being highly concentrated.
On average, 2.2% of borrowers default. A relationship between a borrower and a
lender within the sample last for around 2.6 years.
2 Ciari and Pavanini [2013], who look at market structure and multi market contact in the
Italian banking sector, have used the notion of Local Labor Systems as relevant markets. These
are geographical zones defined according to integrated economic areas and commuting patterns
between councils. We are working on experimenting with this alternative definition to compare the
sensitivity of our results to the choice of market borders.
3 The main European countries’ branches per 1,000 inhabitants and GDP per capita (in 2008
US$), from ECB and World Development Indicators (2008) data, are: France 0.47 (9,823 US$),
Germany 0.61 (9,125$), UK 0.38 (8,062$), Italy 0.23 (7,699$), Spain 0.76 (4,569$).
4 The main European countries’ growth rates in terms of branches per 1,000 inhabitants were:
France -6.4%, Germany -3.3%, UK -14.2%, Italy 78.3%, Spain 22.4%.
5 Based on the definition of the ”Horizontal Merger Guidelines” issued by the U.S. Department
of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission on August 19th, 2010.
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Table 3.1: Summary statistics: Banks and Firms
Variable Obs. Mean Stand. Dev. 5th pctile Median 95th pctile
Panel A: The Bank Sample
Total Assets 900 10,726.8 16,965.6 481.3 3,709 54,354.1
Employees 896 3,179.9 4,582.5 206 1,137 14,038
Bad Loans 893 6.2 6.3 1.9 4.9 15.8
Costs-Income ratio 893 34.5 6.1 25.4 33.1 43.2
Panel B.1: The Borrowing Firm Sample
Total Assets 302,747 8.1 12.2 0.9 4.2 29.1
Employees 272,816 54.4 75.6 3 30 195
Leverage 305,151 0.57 0.28 0 0.62 0.95
Return on Sales 301,821 1.1 7.5 -9.7 1.2 11.1
Short Term Debt 305,752 33 22.9 0 32 70.7
SCORE 307,532 5.2 1.8 2 5 8
No. of Lenders 329,623 4.4 3.3 1 4 11
Utilized Credit 319,792 50.2 54.3 0 38.2 138.4
Panel B.2: The Non-Borrowing Firm Sample
Total Assets 209,754 8.8 20.1 0 2.8 38.8
Employees 176,248 60.6 124.4 0 20 269
Leverage 208,441 0.49 0.36 0 0.52 1
Return on Sales 197,624 2.2 19.6 -17.1 1.2 22.4
Short Term Debt 195,663 23.9 25.7 0 15.7 73.9
SCORE 206,378 4.8 2.1 1 5 8
Note: An observation is the number of bank-years with non-missing records in Panel A,
and firm-years in Panel B. Total assets are in millions of euros. Employees is the number
of employees at the end of the year. Bad loans is a percentage of total loans. Cost-income
ratio is the ratio of overhead to gross income (in %). Return on sales is calculated as
the percentage ratio of current profits over total sales. Short term debt is expressed as a
proportion of total debt. The SCORE is the indicator of the risk of the company computed
each year by the Centrale dei Bilanci (higher values indicate riskier companies). Number of
lenders is the number of banks from which the company borrows. Utilized credit is expressed
as a proportion of credit granted. The first five variables in each of the firm’s sample are
winsorised at the 1st and 99th percentile.
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Table 3.2: Summary statistics: Local Credit Markets
Variable Obs. Mean Stand. Dev. 10th pctile Median 90th pctile
Yearly Amount Lent 1,133 234.7 568.1 22.4 91.8 459.7
Average Interest Rate 1,133 14.78 2.35 11.43 14.88 17.04
N of Banks 1,133 26.65 12.14 12 25 43
N of Entering Banks 1,030 1.96 1.77 0 2 4
N of Exiting Banks 1,030 1.6 1.45 0 1 3
HHI 1,133 1,537.31 695.09 855.77 1,366.97 2,479.49
N of Firms 1,133 277.06 479.3 35 135 655
% of Firms Defaulting 1,133 2.2 2.8 0 1.2 6.1
Avg. Rel. Length 103 2.63 0.17 2.44 2.64 2.83
Note: An observation is a province-year combination for all the variables but the last one,
where an observation si a province. Amount lent is in million of euros.
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3.3 Descriptives and Reduced Form Evidence
3.3.1 Descriptive Statistics
Before introducing some regression results and outlying the features of the structural
model, we want to give a sense of the variation in the data that motivates our
analysis. We are investigating whether asymmetric information between borrowers
and lenders can serve as an entry barrier in the Italian banking sector. This occurs
when incumbent banks have been learning about their borrowers through years of
experience in a market, and are able exploit their informational advantage against
new banks that enter a market without any knowledge of borrowers’ creditworthiness.
We provide preliminary supporting evidence of this effect, showing that incumbents
maintain a large share of the market, and have on average a safer pool of borrowers,
to which they are able to charge a higher rate compared to newly entering banks.
We focus on a subsample of the data, comparing over a five years period the
performance of banks starting to lend in a market for the first time to the existing
incumbents. We take the years between 1990 and 1994, and define as incumbents
those banks that were present in the market before 1988, and as entrants only the
banks that started lending in a market for the first time in 1990.6 We drop all the
entrants after 1990 and simply compare some outcomes between incumbents and
entrants over that period.
We start with Figure 3.1a, where we present the evolution of the average
market share of incumbents and entrants. The figure shows how incumbents maintain
a larger share of the market, and entrants slowly increase their quota over the years.
Note however that on average entrants gain only about 5% market shares over this 5
years period. We also present evidence of how much of the credit granted borrowers
end up using, summarized in Figure 3.1b. The graph shows that, at least for their
first two years in a market, entrants attract borrowers that use a higher share of
their loan with respect to the incumbents’ borrowers. This suggests that the new
entrants’ first batch of borrowers is less capable of self-financing its projects.
One of the ways entrants try to increase their presence in the market is
charging a lower rate than the incumbents, as shown in Figure 3.2a. Note that this
interest rate difference between incumbents and entrants tends to persist over the
years. We also take all the new entrants since 1990 and average their rates over the
numbers of years they have spent in the market, in Figure 3.2b. This shows how
6 We take this time period just as an example, and limit ourself to 5 years as in most of the
descriptives the differences between incumbents and entrants either reduce substantially after that
or show a clear enough trend.
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entrants increase their rates as they gain more experience in a market.
Last, we present evidence of how new entrants attract a worse pool of bor-
rowers with respect to incumbents. We distinguish between bank’s observable and
unobservable riskiness of its borrowers. First, we show in Figure 3.3a that the aver-
age borrowers’ SCORE is higher for entrants, and takes about 3 years to reach the
incumbents’ level. Second, we present in Figure 3.3b the average default rates of
banks’ borrowers. Here there seems to be a strong difference between entrants and
incumbents especially in the first year. Moreover, entrants’ borrowers seem to be
less creditworthy in years of crisis, like 1994, when the overall average default rate of
firms peaked with respect to the previous years in our sample. We will investigate
this effect in more detail in the next section.
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Figure 3.1: Credit for Incumbent vs. Entrant Banks
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Figure 3.2: Interes Rates
(a) Incumbents vs Entrants
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Figure 3.3: Borrowers’ Riskiness for Incumbent vs. Entrant Banks
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3.3.2 Experience and Default
In this section we provide some reduced form evidence of the impact of banks’ ex-
perience on default rates of its borrowers. We define experience as an unobserved
stock of knowledge about a market and its borrowers that a lender accumulates over
the years, which might also be regarded as the bank’s stock of soft information. We
assume that we can proxy experience with a function of the number of branches that
a bank has in a market and the years that it has been there for. The idea is that
the more branches a bank has, or the more years a bank is present for, the more it
acquires information about a market, as it can screen and lend to a larger number
of borrowers both in different parts of the market and across time. Thus, we inves-
tigate whether the cumulative share of branches in a market overtime improves the
quality of the pool of borrowers in the following periods. The standard literature on
learning by doing, as explained by Benkard [2000], would measure bank-market-year
experience based on the following formula:
ejmt = δejmt−1 + qjmt−1, (3.1)
where the bank’s stock of experience depreciates yearly by a factor 1−δ, also
defined as organizational forgetting, and qjmt is bank j’s share of branches in market
m at time t. We will use this baseline formula as a starting point for the structural
model, but simplify it for the reduced form regressions, where we don’t estimate δ,
but assume experience is determined by a weighted average based on the harmonic
series of past and current market shares. In particular, we define it as:
ejmt =
t∑
τ=1
(
qjmτ
)τ
t
. (3.2)
This harmonic series allows us to give more weight to more recent market
shares.7 We run an OLS regression of the following baseline model:
djmt = γejmt + βXjmt + δt + ωj + κm + εjmt, (3.3)
where djmt is the default rate of the borrowers that bank j lends to in market
m at year t. This rate is constructed as the ratio of number of defaulting firms over
total number of firms the bank lends to in that market in that year. We control
for year, bank and market fixed effects. We also control for other bank-year-market
level variables, as the average interest rate, score and leverage of the bank’s pool
7 We have experimented with other definitions of experience, for example with cumulative
amount lent, obtaining very similar results.
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of borrowers. Residuals are clustered at the bank-market level. OLS estimates are
summarized in Table 3.3, distinguishing between new borrowers, old borrowers, and
the whole sample. We define new firms as firms that have never borrowed before
from one lender (at least in our data), and old firms as borrowers that have at least
one year of lending relationship with a bank.
These results show that bank’s experience is negatively and significantly cor-
related with the average default rate of both their old and new borrowers. The effect
of experience is stronger for old firms. The estimates in Table 3.3 show that 1%
increase in experience reduces average borrowers’ default rate by 0.1 and 0.2 per-
centage points for new and old firms. Note that the mean of default rate is 6.3%
and the standard deviation is 11%. The average rate, score, and leverage of bor-
rowers have a positive and significant effect on default rates, as expected. In Figure
3.4 we report the correlation between default rates and experience, controlling for
all the fixed effects and bank controls listed above. These results suggest that ex-
perience, measured as a function of number of branches and years in a market, is
beneficial for the lender, as it improves its pool of borrowers overtime. This can
be regarded as a valid motivation for developing a structural model that is able to
explain the mechanism driving this result as well as its consequences in terms of
market structure.
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Table 3.3: Banks’ borrowers’ default rate
Variable New Firms Old Firms All Firms
Experience -0.001∗∗∗ -0.002∗∗∗ -0.002∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Avg Rate 0.028∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.009) (0.007)
Avg Score 0.049∗∗∗ 0.118∗∗∗ 0.125∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.016) (0.017)
Avg Leverage 0.017∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗ 0.035∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.007) (0.006)
Obs 12,642 12,161 14,788
R2 0.141 0.477 0.545
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Banks FE Yes Yes Yes
Markets FE Yes Yes Yes
Note: One observation is bank-year-market. Standard errors are clustered at the
bank-market level. All variables are expressed in logs.
Figure 3.4: Average Borrowers’ Default Rate and Banks’ Experience
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3.3.3 Experience and Entry and Exit
We also look at the relationship between entry, exit and experience in Table 3.4.
Entry is defined as the act of lending for the first time in a market, and exit means
stop lending in that market.8 Following the example of the entry and exit policy
functions estimated by Ryan [2012], we construct own ejmt and rivals’ e−jmt expe-
rience variables, based on the definition described in the previous section. We also
look at the effect of concentration of incumbents’ experience (HHIexp), in terms of
Herfindahl Hirschmann Index. We control for year, bank and market fixed effects.
Residuals are clustered at the bank-market level. We run the following two probit
models, whose marginal effects are reported in Table 3.4:
Pr(χjmt = 1; ejmt = 0) = Φ
(
γ1e−jmt + γ2HHIexpmt + βXjmt + δt + ωj + κm
)
Pr(χjmt = 0; ejmt > 0) = Φ
(
γ1e−jmt + γ2HHIexpmt + γ3ejmt + βXjmt + δt + ωj + κm
)
,
(3.4)
where χjmt = 1 means entry and χjmt = 0 means exit. We find that incum-
bents’ experience has no effect on entry, but concentration of incumbents’ experience
has a negative and significant impact. This effect is present across different speci-
fications. One unit increase in experience concentration (with mean 0.35, std dev
0.17) reduces entry probability by 0.037. We interpret this as additional potential
evidence of entry barriers, as new entrants are less likely to approach markets where
experience is concentrated among few incumbent banks.9 We also show that banks’
own experience has a negative and significant effect on exit. One unit increase in
own experience (with mean 0.04, std dev 0.23) reduces exit probability by 0.052.
The effect of own experience on exit is robust to various specifications. This result
is complementary to what we find in the entry model, reflecting the fact that in-
cumbents with more experience are less likely to exit a market, which implies that
experience fosters their profitability.
8 In this analysis we don’t distinguish between greenfield entry (exit) and entry (exit) by merger
and acquisition. However, most of the mergers and acquisitions in the Italian banking sector
occurred in the beginning of the 2000s. See Ciari and Pavanini [2013] for a more extensive discussion
on this point.
9 A similar result has been found by Ciari and De Bonis [2011], who use an instrumental variables
approach to show that Italian banks during the early stage of deregulation were more likely to open
branches in more competitive markets rather than concentrated ones. They define competition
as the difference between interest rates on loans and deposits, instrumented using pre-regulation
(1936) market structure, as in Guiso et al. [2004].
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Table 3.4: Banks’ entry and exit decisions
Variable Entry Exit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Own Experience - - - - -0.069∗∗∗ -0.071∗∗∗ -0.075∗∗∗ -0.052∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.006)
Rivals’ Experience 0.022∗ 0.020 0.066 0.059 0.002 -0.007 -0.007 0.077
(0.012) (0.012) (0.054) (0.054) (0.038) (0.037) (0.140) (0.140)
HHI Experience -0.028∗∗∗ -0.028∗∗∗ -0.037∗∗∗ -0.037∗∗∗ 0.019∗ 0.020∗∗ -0.071∗∗ -0.050
(0.003) (0.004) (0.013) (0.013) (0.010) (0.010) (0.036) (0.033)
Year FE No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Market FE No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Banks FE No No No Yes No No No Yes
Obs 71,750 71,750 71,750 70,737 23,240 23,240 23,240 21,689
PseudoR2 0.0036 0.0179 0.0352 0.1519 0.0135 0.0329 0.0459 0.3865
Note: One observation is bank-year-market. For entry, we allow each bank that is not
already present to be a potential entrant in each market. For exit, we let each incumbent
to potentially exit from each market where it’s present. Standard errors are clustered at
the bank-market level. All variables are in levels.
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3.4 The Model
We build a structural model of firms’ demand, loan size and default with asymmet-
ric information, and of banks’ entry, exit, investment and pricing. Given the facts
presented in the reduced form evidence, we construct a model that allows banks
to learn about their borrowers through experience, reducing defaults and increasing
their profits. However, as pointed out in Besanko et al. [2010], learning can be used
strategically by banks to promote their market dominance and generate concentra-
tion. As documented in Guiso et al. [2007], the strict entry regulation imposed on
the Italian banking sector between 1936 and 1990 generated the unintended con-
sequence of different degrees of competition across Italian provinces, and therefore
different degrees of concentration. This means that at deregulation incumbent banks
in highly concentrated markets had accumulated a higher level of experience com-
pared to incumbents in low concentration markets, which granted them a bigger
informational advantage with respect to new entrants. We investigate whether the
higher information gap with incumbents represents a barrier to entry for new banks,
as it makes learning for new entrants more costly in more concentrated markets.
This resembles the theoretical results presented in Dell’Ariccia [2001], who shows
that entry will be more difficult in markets where the institutional framework allows
incumbent banks to acquire pervasive information about their clients.
3.4.1 Demand and Pricing
The demand and pricing side of the model is based on Crawford et al. [2013]. Assume
there are i = 1, ..., I firms of type k = 1, ...,K and j = 1, ..., J banks in m = 1, ...,M
markets. We omit the k subscript for simplicity. Let firms have the following utility
from credit, which determines their demand:
UDijm = α
D
i + δ
D
jm(Xjm, Pjm, ξ
D
jm, β
D) + V Dijm(Yijm, η
D) + εDijm. (3.5)
We normalize to zero the utility from the outside option, which is not bor-
rowing. Firms will choose the bank that maximizes their utility, or will choose not
to borrow. Then, conditional on borrowing, they will choose the share of amount
granted to use that maximizes the following utility:
ULijm = α
L + δLjm(Xjm, Pjm, ξ
L
jm, β
L) + V Lijm(Yijm, η
L) + εLim. (3.6)
69
Finally, conditional on borrowing, they will choose to default if the following
utility is greater than zero:
UFijm = α
F + δFjm(Xjm, Pjm, ξ
F
jm, β
F ) + V Fijm(Yijm, η
F ) + εFim. (3.7)
Here Xjm are banks’ observable attributes, Pjm are the posted interest rates
mentioned above, ξjm are banks’ unobservable (to the econometrician) attributes,
and Yijm are firms’ observable characteristics. We assume that εDijm is distributed as a
type 1 extreme value, following the literature on demand estimation for differentiated
products (Berry [1994], Berry et al. [1995]). We let the random coefficient of the
demand’s constant term αDi = α¯
D + σDνi, with νi ∼ N(0, 1), to be jointly normally
distributed with εLim, and ε
F
im, such that: α
D
εL
εF
 ∼ N

 α¯
D
0
0
 ,
 σ
2
D 0 ρDF
0 σ2L ρLF
ρDF ρLF 1

 . (3.8)
We interpret a positive correlation between the firm specific unobservables
driving demand and default (ρDF ) as evidence of adverse selection. The intuition
is that if the unobservables that drive demand are positively correlated with the
unobservables that drive default, then riskier firms are more likely to demand. The
idea behind the identification of the correlation between αDi and ε
F
im is the following.
If we observe a firm taking out a loan, while the model tells us that this firm should
be unlikely to take the loan, then this is a "high αDi " firm. A positive correlation of
αDi with ε
F
im is evidence of adverse selection.
We interpret a positive correlation between the unobservables driving loan
size and default (ρLF ) as evidence of moral hazard. The intuition is that if the
unobservables that drive the choice of how much credit to use are positively correlated
with the unobservables that drive default, then riskier firms will use more credit. We
define this as moral hazard because the decision on how much loan to use is an action
taken after the borrower and lender have agreed on the contract terms. With this
definition of moral hazard we are trying to capture the case in which a risky firm
(high εFim), before signing the contract, already knows that due to its high ε
L
im it will
use a higher share of the loan. However, our definition cannot rule out the case in
which two ex-ante equally risky firms take the same loan, and one of them is hit by
a negative shock after the contract has been signed. This shock increases εLim for the
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firm that was hit, forcing it to use more of the loan, but not due to moral hazard. 10
This identification strategy allows us to recover adverse selection and moral hazard
parameters that are common across banks and markets, not bank or market specific.
On the supply side, we let banks set their interest rates competing à la
Bertrand Nash. We assume that bank j’s profits are given by the sum of profits
made with each subset of borrowers’ types k:
Πjkm = (Pjkm −MCjm)Qjkm(1− Fjkm)−MCjmQjkmFjkm
= PjkmQjkm(1− Fjkm)−MCjmQjkm,
(3.9)
where Qjkm and Fjkm are bank’s expectation of demand and default. In
particular, Qjkm is given by the model’s market shares and the expected loan size,
and Fjkm is the average default rate for the borrowers of type k that bank j lends to
in market m, following Assumption 1. Pjkm is the price of the loan (1 + rj). MCjm
are the bank’s marginal costs, which we assume to be constant at the bank-market
level. The first order conditions of this profit function deliver the following pricing
equation:
Pjkm = MCjm − QjkmQ′jkm +AICjkm,
with AICjkm =
MCjmFjkm+MCjmF
′
jkm
Qjkm
Q′
jkm
−F ′jkm
(
Qjkm
Q′
jkm
)2
1−Fjkm−F ′jkm
Qjkm
Q′
jkm
.
(3.10)
Note that the equilibrium price depends on marginal costs and markup Qjkm
Q′jkm
,
as in a standard Bertrand-Nash model with differentiated products, but also on a
term defined as the Asymmetric Information Cost (AICjkm). This term is a function
of default probability Fjkm, derivative of default with respect to prices F ′jkm, bank’s
markup and marginal costs. Both marginal revenues and the default probability
determine the shape of the banks’ profit function, driving it in different directions.
The effect of an increase in interest rates increases on one hand the marginal revenues
from borrowers that don’t drop out, but on the other hand increases also costs from
defaults, in the presence of adverse selection.
10 We don’t have a clear economic interpretation of the correlation between demand and loan size
unobservables, so at the moment we are setting the correlation between them to zero for simplicity.
We are planning to estimate it in future versions of the model.
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3.4.2 Dynamic Game of Entry, Exit, and Investment
The players of the dynamic game are all the J banks entering/exiting, investing and
competing in M markets. These banks decide their static pricing strategy and their
dynamic entry/exit and investment decisions in every market in every year t. We
assume that banks group borrowers into types, based on the observable character-
istics they have access to. We also assume that banks set posted interest rates for
each type of borrower because they cannot observe their individual probability of
default, but can observe just the average default rate of each type, as in Stiglitz and
Weiss [1981].
We focus on the years right after entry deregulation (late 1980s until 1998),
during which the industry experienced a steady growth in entry rates, as well as a
substantial increase in the number of branches. This means that the model environ-
ment is non stationary, as the number of players and the stock of branches in each
market are increasing over time. To give a sense of the patterns in the data, Figure
3.5 shows the mean and standard deviation of the number of banks per province per
year, whereas Figure 3.6 presents mean and the standard deviation of the number
of branches per bank per province per year.11 The market is experiencing a clear
transition starting at the end of the 1980s, when branching deregulation took place.
11 Note that these figures are based on the branch network dataset, which includes all banks, not
only the 90 main banks in the CR data.
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Figure 3.5: Average and Std Deviation of Number of Banks per Province per Year
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Figure 3.6: Average and Std Deviation of Number of Branches per Bank per Province
per Year
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The non stationary environment means that we cannot rely on the station-
ary Markovian structure that characterize the notion of Markov Perfect Equilibrium
(MPE) in Ericson and Pakes [1995]. Therefore also two-step methods as Bajari
et al. [2007] cannot be applied, as the range of the state variables that determine
policy and value functions is changing over time. An alternative solution would be
computing the equilibrium strategies and value functions at every period, with a
clear computational problem due to the curse of dimensionality. We model instead
this short run dynamic behavior of the industry using the notion of Nonstationary
Oblivious Equilibrium (NOE), proposed by Weintraub et al. [2008a]. This equilib-
rium concept has been proven to approximate well MPE for industries with a large
number of firms that are experiencing short run transitional dynamics after a shock
or policy change, converging to a new stationary equilibrium in the long run. This
approach is an extension to the Oblivious Equilibrium (OE) concept introduced by
Weintraub et al. [2008b], and Weintraub et al. [2010]. Given the large number of
players, NOE assumes that firms make decisions based only on their own state vari-
ables and on the deterministic average industry state, meaning that individual firms’
actions don’t affect directly the other firms’ decisions.12 This assumption well suits
our case, as we have on average 26 banks per market.
We let the industry evolve over discrete time periods and an infinite hori-
zon, in line with Ericson and Pakes [1995]. Time periods are indexed by t ∈
{0, 1, 2, ...,∞}, and there is a discount factor β ∈ (0, 1). The number of incum-
bent banks at time t in market m is defined as ntm. A relevant bank-specific state
variable is experience ejtm ∈ {0, 1, 2, ..., E}, which varies over markets and time, and
influences borrowers’ demand and default rate. The industry state stm is a vector
that specifies the number of banks at experience level e in period t in market m. We
also define the state of competitors of bank j as s−jtm(e) = stm(e) − 1 if ejtm = e,
and s−jtm(e) = stm(e) otherwise. Similarly, n−jtm is the number of competitors of
bank j.
Incumbent banks can decide to invest Ajmt through branching to improve
their experience level, but experience can also depreciate due to organizational for-
getting. We assume that branching decisions are market specific, even though banks
operate across different markets. This assumptions derives from the empirical evi-
dence of local banking competition (Degryse and Ongena [2005]), which implies that
it is reasonable to think that local managers play an important role in taking deci-
12 Benkard et al. [2013] recently developed an extension to this framework called Partially Obliv-
ious Equilibrium. This allows for some dominant firms playing Markovian strategies, whose states
are always monitored by all other firms in the market, and for a competitive fringe playing Oblivious
strategies but monitoring the dominant firms.
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sions about local investment, as they have a better knowledge of the market.13. We
construct the experience state variable as a function of the number of branches that
a bank has in a market and the number of years that those branches have been in
that market. We let experience influence borrowers’ demand, as firms might have a
preference for larger and well established networks of branches. We also allow ex-
perience to have an impact on borrowers’ default rate, as experienced banks attract
a better pool of firms. We already provided empirical supporting evidence in the
reduced form section for this assumption.
Following this literature on learning by doing however doesn’t allow us to
model in detail the way banks reduce, if any, the extent of asymmetric information
and learn about their borrowers. It does allow us to find a reduction in banks’
borrowers’ default rates as the bank accumulates experience in a market overtime.
The reduction in asymmetric information is one of the possible explanation of this
reduction in default rates, but we cannot rule out other possible causes, like in-
creased bank efficiency or more better matching in firm-bank relationships. One of
the possible ways to identify a reduction in asymmetric information would be to
model the correlation coefficients as a time-varying process, such as an autoregres-
sive one, dependent on the year of the firm-bank relationship. This would allow us
to test whether asymmetric information reduces as firm-bank relationships evolve,
quantifying how much it contributes to the decline in default rates.14
Following Weintraub et al. [2010] and Pakes and McGuire [1994], we define
the transition probability of experience as:
P (e′|e,A) =

(1−δ)θ(A+e)
1+θ(A+e) if e
′ = e+ 1
1−δ+δθ(A+e)
1+θ(A+e) if e
′ = e
δ
1+θ(A+e) if e
′ = e− 1
(3.11)
where θ is the branching efficiency parameter, and δ ∈ [0, 1] is the probability
that banks’ experience depreciates, capturing organisational forgetting. Note that
under this specification of the transition probability banks can increase their stock
of experience even without opening new branches. This is because experience grows
also when new firms borrow from existing branches. We model banks’ investment
cost as C(Ajtm, ψjtm) = max{(1 + γψjtm)Ajtm,0}, in line with Qi [2013], where
ψjtm ∈ N(0, 1) is an IID investment shock, private information of each bank, and γ
is an investment cost.
13 Aguirregabiria and Ho [2012] make a similar assumption about decisions of local managers in
the airline industry, in the context of a dynamic entry and exit game.
14 Extending the model in this direction is scope for future research.
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Each period incumbent banks can decide to exit a market if a privately ob-
served sell-off value φjmt is greater than the continuation value. We express this
decision as χjmt = 1. Similarly, every period new firms can enter the market paying
a sunk cost κ, and they all enter with zero experience. This action is denoted by
jmt = 1.
The timing of the game is the following:
• All banks observe the industry state stm
• Incumbent banks receive a private draw from the distribution of scrap values
of exit and decide to leave the market or not.
• Potential entrants receive a draw from the distribution of entry costs and make
their entry decision.
• Incumbent banks receive a draw from the distribution of investment cost and
make their branching decision.
• Incumbent banks compete over interest rates.
• Incumbent banks accumulate experience and exit if they decided so. Potential
entrants enter the market.
• The industry evolves to st+1m.
3.4.3 Equilibrium
We approximate a Markov Perfect Equilibrium using the concept of Nonstationary
Oblivious Equilibrium, which accommodates a short run dynamic industry behavior
assuming that there will be a stationary oblivious equilibrium in the long run, once
the transition period is over. We follow the set up outlined by Qi [2013]. This notion
adapts well to our case, given the large number of banks in each market and then
nonstationary environment that characterises the period we’re looking at. One of
the main assumptions in a NOE is that banks’ strategies in terms of entry (t), exit
(χt), and investment (ιt) do not depend on the industry state stm. This is because
the trajectory of the expected industry state s˜tm, given an initial industry state
s0m, evolves deterministically. Hence, the policy functions will only depend on the
relevant state variables ejmt and ψjmt. The incumbent’s strategy is defined as µt =
{χt(ejmt), ιt(ejmt, ψjmt)}. From now on we suppress the bank-market subscripts for
simplicity.
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Given all banks follow the same strategy profiles µ,  and an initial industry
state s0, we denote as s˜{µ,,s0},t the expected industry state at time t, and define
banks’ experience transition probability function as:
P(e′|e, ψ, µt) = P (e′|e, ιt(e, ψ))(1− exp(−χt(e)/K), (3.12)
where the second term on the right hand side is the probability of a bank not
exiting, under the assumption of the scrap value φ being drawn from an exponential
distribution with mean K. We can define the expected experience transition proba-
bilities as EPµt(e, e′) = Eψ[P(e′|e, ψ, µt)], so that the sequence of industry states will
be:
s˜t+1(e) =
{ ∑E
k=0 EPµt(k, e)s˜t(k) + t if e = eent∑E
k=0 EPµt(k, e)s˜t(k) otherwise
(3.13)
where eent is the level of experience of a new entrant. We define a nonsta-
tionary oblivious value function for period t for an incumbent bank at experience
level e, conditional on its own strategy µ′, its competitors’ strategies µ and entry
rates , as:
V˜t(e|µ′, µ, , s) = Πt(e, s˜t) + Eφ
[
max{φt, Eψ[V˜ Ct(e, ψ|µ′, µ, )]}
]
, (3.14)
where V˜ C() is the incumbent’s continuation value conditional on not exiting,
expressed as:
V˜ Ct(e, ψ|µ′, µ, ) = max
ι
−C(ι, ψ) + βEe′ [V˜t+1(e′|µ′, µ, )]. (3.15)
A NOE consists of a strategy profile µ˜ that maximises the incumbent’s value
function and of a strategy profile ˜ that maximises the entrant’s value function, such
that t = 1 if:
Vent(eent) = βV˜t+1(eent|µ˜, µ˜, ˜) ≥ κ (3.16)
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3.5 Estimation
We estimate the static part of the model as in Crawford et al. [2013], which explains
the details of the econometric model. We use the demand, loan size and default
probabilities to construct the simulated maximum likelihood that allows us to recover
the parameters in η = {ηD, ηL, ηF },15 and the correlation coefficients ρDF and ρLF :
logL =
∑
i
log(PrDijm)Dijm+
∑
i∈D
[
log(PrLijm)+log(Pr
F
ijm)Fijm+log(1−PrFijm)(1−Fijm)
]
,
(3.17)
where PrDijm is probability that borrower i in marketm chooses lender j, Pr
L
ijm
is the probability of observing a utilization of Lijm, and PrFijm is the probability
of default conditional on taking a loan. Dijm is the actual bank choice from the
data, and Fijm is the default from the data. In order to estimate the parameters
β = {α¯D, αL, αF , βD, βL, βF } we need an additional step. Given some instruments
Zjm, we recover β using instrumental variables.
To estimate the dynamic parameters Θ = {θ, δ, γ, φ, κ}, we follow a simulated
method of moments similar to other applications of oblivious equilibrium, as Xu
[2008] and Qi [2013]. These parameters include branching efficiency θ, experience
depreciation δ, cost of investment γ, exit scrap value φ, and sunk cost of entry κ.
15 In this version of the model we are not estimating the standard deviation of the random
coefficient of the constant term in demand, setting it to σD = 1. This is due to the well known
identification problem of these coefficients in Berry et al. [1995], explained in Berry et al. [2004]
and Train and Winston [2007]. We are working on incorporating second preferred choices into the
model to guarantee better identification and be able to estimate that parameter.
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3.6 Counterfactuals
We compare the estimated model against two counterfactual scenarios. One is the
case of no borrower-lender asymmetry of information, the other is the case of reduced
information gap between experienced and unexperienced banks. In the first case, we
set the correlation coefficients that identify asymmetric information to zero. In the
second case, we allow new entrants to have a higher initial experience stock. Doing
this, we want to explore the consequences in terms of welfare, credit rationing, and
market structure of these two dimensions of information asymmetry. The type of
policy that could implement these reduction could be a regulation that allows for
more information sharing between banks, or also a policy that restricts the number
of incumbents that a market could have. One of the questions we try to answer is
whether concentration can improve welfare in the presence of asymmetric informa-
tion.
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3.7 Conclusion
This paper investigates the effect of asymmetric information on market structure
in the Italian banking industry. Using a detailed and highly representative dataset
of contracts between borrowers and lenders over 11 years, we show that incum-
bent banks accumulate an informational advantage over potential entrants, and this
advantage affects banks’ entry and exit decisions. Hence, we develop a dynamic
structural model of banks’ entry, exit and investment through branching that allows
banks to accumulate experience and improve the quality of their borrowers over time,
and gives incumbent banks an informational advantage over new entrants. We in-
corporate into this framework a companion static model of firms’ demand for credit,
loan size, default, and banks’ pricing from Crawford et al. [2013], which allows for
borrower-lender asymmetric information. We assume that banks follow nonstation-
ary oblivious strategies, as defined by Weintraub et al. [2008b] and Benkard et al.
[2013], given the large number of players in each market and the nonstationary en-
vironment of the post-deregulation period.
We provide reduced form evidence of learning by branching, showing that
banks improve the quality of their borrowers as they accumulate experience over
the years. We also show that entry is negatively correlated with concentration of
incumbents’ experience, and that exit is negatively correlated with a bank’s own
experience level. We propose two counterfactual policy experiments to quantify
the effects of information asymmetries between borrowers and lenders and between
incumbents and potential entrants on market structure, welfare, and credit rationing.
In the first case, we do so computing a new equilibrium once we eliminate what we
define as adverse selection and moral hazard. In the second case, we allow newly
entering banks to have a higher level of experience with respect to the actual data,
and compare the new equilibrium outcomes that emerge.
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Abstract
This paper measures the impact of endogenous multi market contact on entry deci-
sions of Italian national banks. We develop a static model of market structure with
incomplete information as in Seim [2006], allowing for global players’ heterogeneity
and spatial correlation of entry decisions across different local markets. The frame-
work is estimated based upon the expansion of the three main Italian commercial
banks, Unicredit, Intesa San Paolo and Monte dei Paschi, which have been pro-
gressively gaining control of the market after 1990’s entry deregulation. Preliminary
results show that multi market contact enhances banks’ profitability, suggesting that
it might facilitate implicit collusion as in Bernheim and Whinston [1990].
4.1 Introduction
The effects of multi market contact on a firm’s strategic decisions have been widely
investigated, both theoretically and empirically, to detect a possible channel for tacit
collusion. Most of the literature has focused on the implications for competitiveness,
taking market structure as given. However, besides the collusive effects on whichever
dimension firms are competing upon, multi market contact can also have a significant
impact on firms’ entry decisions.
The first paper documenting a potentially anticompetitive outcome in the
presence of linked oligopoly was Edwards [1955], which introduced the idea that
competition between large rivals whose interests touch at many points may "convert
a warfare into total war", as the author says, supporting the incentive to a live
and let live strategy. Feinberg [1984] contributed to the theoretical foundations of
multi market contact, analyzing the effects of cross-market mutual forbearance as
an extension of standard oligopoly theory. Later, Bernheim and Whinston [1990]
formalized the results of collusive gains from multi market contact only for the cases
of either non identical firms, or non identical markets, or differentiated products.
Spagnolo [1999] found that multiple links always facilitates collusion when the firms’
objective functions are strictly concave and market supergames are ”interdependent”.
Most of the empirical literature finds a positive and significant relationship be-
tween multi market contact and profitability. Hughes and Oughton [1993] look at the
effect of diversification and multiple links on profitability across 134 UK manufactur-
ing industries, finding a clear positive effect. Jans and Rosenbaum [1993] investigate
the impact of multi market contact on pricing in the US cement industry, showing a
positive relationship between price-cost margins and number of contacts. Evans and
Kessides [1994] concentrate on the US airline industry, finding that fares are higher
in city-pair markets served by companies with extensive interroute contacts. The
authors claim that these results are driven by airlines avoiding aggressive pricing for
fear of retaliation in other city-pairs. On this basis, Ciliberto and Williams [2013]
propose a structural approach to show that multiple contacts between US airlines
facilitate collusion. They construct a model of oligopolistic behavior, where some
conduct parameters are functions of pair-specific multi market contacts. The main
result is that carriers with numerous contacts can sustain near-perfect cooperation
in setting fares. Also a recent paper by Chicu and Ziebarth [2013], applied to the US
cement industry, finds that multi market contact fosters tacit collusion and higher
prices. The authors present a novel measure of contact that accounts for capacity
utilization.
Relaxing the underlying assumption of exogenous market structure leaves
scope for several other relevant questions. How does a multi market firm’s entry
decision depend on the number of contacts it has with the potential rivals entering
the same market? Do firms prefer to have many links with their rivals or do they
avoid each other? In one case they might find it profitable to establish many contacts,
as this would facilitate collusion and make any form of retaliation more costly. In
the other case, they might prefer dividing up the markets in spheres of influence,
or might value the option of pricing aggressively in some specific markets without
experiencing widespread price wars. In a recent paper Byford and Gans [2014]
extend the theory model of Bernheim and Whinston [1990] allowing for entry and
exit with multimarket contact. The authors show that there can be an equilibrium
with collusion at the extensive margin, where firms collude by avoiding entry into
each others’ markets. This implies that a system of mutual forbearance might be
optimal for firms, in a strategy to divide and conquer separate geographical markets.
We propose to address these questions developing a static model of market structure
with incomplete information as in Seim [2006], introducing endogenous multi market
contact creation. We model the entry decisions of heterogeneous global players,
allowing for spatial correlation of entry across different markets through a multi
market contact index. We experiment with various indices, but mostly concentrate
on contacts in neighboring markets rather than all possible existing contacts. This
is motivated by the important role of distance in banking and by the local nature of
banking competition, as described in Degryse and Ongena [2005]. In this paper we
focus on the relationship between profitability and number of contacts, controlling
for demand and cost effects using market specific characteristics.
The case of banks’ expansion in Italy is a good candidate for this analysis
for several reasons. After entry deregulation at the beginning of the 90s, there has
been a steady consolidation process. By 2005 there had been a 152% growth in
the national Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) in terms of branches, and the 3
main players Unicredit, Intesa San Paolo and Monte dei Paschi’s combined shares
passed from 8% in 1990 to around 30% in 2005. Given the important role played
by these 3 banks, we focus our analysis on their expansion patterns, considering
the remaining local and savings banks as a competitive fringe. The literature on
multi market contact in the Italian banking sector presents conflicting evidence. For
the 1990-1996 period, De Bonis and Ferrando [2000] test how multi market links
with other banks across provinces affect the change in bank-province-year specific
loan market shares, finding a positive effect. They also find that multiple contacts
are negatively correlated with lending rates. These two results contradict the multi
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market contact hypothesis. On the other hand, Coccorese and Pellecchia [2009] show
that in later years (2002-2005) market-level and firm-level profitability, measured in
terms of return on assets, is positively correlated with the average number of contacts
among banks. Finally, Molnar et al. [2011] propose a structural model of demand
and supply of deposit retail services, testing banks’ conduct under Bertrand-Nash,
partial or perfect collusion based on banks’ contacts. They find evidence of partial
collusion, especially for banks with more contacts.
We present reduced form and structural evidence that shows how multi mar-
ket contact has a positive influence on entry probability, with different effects for
different banks. We find a stronger impact for closer neighboring markets and for
lower share of branches of local players. We also allow for homogeneous or het-
erogeneous effects of multi market contact across the three different banks. In one
specification, we impose the same coefficient for the three of them. In a second one,
we allow each bank to have a different effect of multi market contact on their prof-
itability. In the last specification, we allow for bank-to-bank specific multi market
contact coefficients. We find a substantially positive effect of multi market contact
in the first two cases.
The contribution of the paper is twofold. First, we expand a static entry
model with incomplete information to allow for endogenous multi market contact
creation. We investigate a novel aspect for the literature on static entry in general
(Bresnahan and Reiss [1991], Berry [1992], Mazzeo [2002], Toivanen and Waterson
[2005]), as well as for its banking applications (Cohen and Mazzeo [2007]). Second,
we contribute to the empirical banking literature, where there is little evidence of the
effect of multi market contact on entry (Fuentelsaz and Gomez [2006]). Differently
from most of the papers on linked oligopoly in Italy, we define the geographical
markets in term of local labor systems (LLS) instead of provinces. These local
markets are comparable in size to the Labor Market Areas in the US, used for most
of the entry literature in the US, and are defined according to integrated economic
areas and commuting patterns between councils. For these reasons, the LLS are
likely to represent more accurately the area where banks compete.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the dataset and the
local markets, section 3 designs the framework and section 4 outlines the econometric
specification. The reduced form and structural results are described in section 5,
section 6 concludes.
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4.2 Data and Local Markets
We apply our model to the case of the main Italian banks’ expansion up to 2005.
The dataset employed consists of the yearly branching network for the population
of Italian banks between 1959 and 2005 at the city council level. It also includes all
the merger and acquisition patterns, mostly concentrated at the end of the 1990s.
We will however only make use of the market structure in 2005 for our application.1
The Italian banking sector has been heavily regulated since the 1936, in
response to the effects of the 1929 great depression on the credit market. The
solution adopted by the Italian government was to strictly discipline the sector both
in terms of branching and in terms of types of credit instruments that banks were
allowed to provide, with a specific aim for geographic and scope risk diversification
(Polsi [2000]). Different banks were in fact restricted to different functions in terms
of length of credit relationships, economic sectors, as well as territorial areas of
expansion.
The European economic integration process fostered a substantial deregu-
lation of the Italian credit market, that took place between 1990 and 1993. The
reforms implemented were aimed at favoring the development of universal banks
that could compete against each other, removing all the scope and territorial expan-
sion restrictions that had been in place for over 50 years. In the years that followed
the sector experienced a consolidation process that led the three main credit institu-
tions, Unicredit (UC), Intesa San Paolo (SP), and Monte dei Paschi di Siena (MPS),
to control around 30% of the branches in the country by 2005. For this reason, we
focus our attention on these three national banks, and regard local, cooperative, and
savings banks as a competitive fringe.
Differently from most of the entry literature on Italian banking, we don’t
consider the province as a local market, but rather the Local Labour Systems (LLS).
These are defined by the Italian national statistical institute (ISTAT) as urban ag-
glomeration units of city councils geographically and statistically comparable. They
are used by ISTAT to investigate the socio-economic structure of Italy from a local
perspective, and are constructed based on commuting patterns between councils,
just like the LMA in the United States. This definition of local markets, based on
economic contiguity among bordering local areas, appears to be more appropriate
than that of provinces, which represent bigger administrative units. Following Co-
hen and Mazzeo [2007], the required characteristics for a local banking market are:
(1) consumers in the defined geographic markets should not typically use depository
1 We will explain this choice in detail in the results’ section.
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institutions outside of their area and (2) distinct or overlapping submarkets should
not exist within the defined geographic markets. Table 4.1 presents some descriptive
statistics on size, population, and economic activity of the LLS. Table 4.2 describes
the LLS in terms of branch networks, both for national and local banks.
The 1990 entry deregulation gave rise to a large wave of entry and mergers and
acquisitions that increased substantially the levels of concentration in local markets.
During this period, the three main national banks gained a relevant market share
and expanded their network of reciprocal contacts across LLSs. Figure 4.1 shows
the evolution of the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) in terms of branches over
the 1990-2005 period, measured every five years at the national, province and local
labor system level.
The data suggests a clear diverging pattern whether we look at the national or
local dimension. At the national level, the concentration of the industry significantly
increased, with the HHI going from 0.0116 in 1990 to 0.0292 in 2005 (a growth rate
of 152%). As a result of the mergers and overall consolidation, few banks acquired
control of the market at the country level. However, when we turn to the local
dimension concentration decreased constantly over the period considered, both for
provinces and LLSs. So, if on one side many small players exited the market and
few big players gained control, local markets become apparently more contestable.
Figure 4.2 reports the joint market share of the three big banks at the national and
LLS level. The combined shares at the country level grow from 8.77% in 1990 to
28.31% in 2005, and similarly at the local level. Figure 4.3 shows how the number
of contacts that the three main players have in local Italian markets increased from
1990 to 2005. In this figure, we measure multi market contacts as the sum of markets
in which pairs of banks or the three main banks are both present with at least one
branch.
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Table 4.1: Summary Statistics on Local Labour Systems
Variable N Mean Stand. Dev. 5th pctile Median 95th pctile
N. of City Councils 686 11.81 13.35 2 7 36
Surface 686 439.25 349.44 88.64 353.80 1,152.17
Population 686 83,084.17 222,418.03 7,020 33,966.50 262,233
Employment Rate 686 43.18 7.20 32.70 42.95 54.10
Unemployment Rate 686 8.89 5.37 2.80 7.65 18.40
Manufacturing Units 686 861.19 2,125.92 55 283 2,923
Value Added 686 16,309.77 6,408.10 7,196.54 16,115.76 26,965.87
No Specialization 686 0.32 0.47 0 0 1
Urban 686 0.07 0.25 0 0 1
Non Manufacturing 686 0.19 0.39 0 0 1
Textile and Clothing 686 0.15 0.35 0 0 1
Other Made in Italy 686 0.19 0.39 0 0 1
Heavy Manufacturing 686 0.08 0.27 0 0 1
Note: One observation is a Local Labor System. Surface is measured in squared kilo-
meters. Value added is measured in euros. The variables no specialization, urban, non
manufacturing, textile and clothing, other made in Italy, and heavy manufacturing are
binary.
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Table 4.2: Summary Statistics on Local Labour Systems
Variable Mean Stand. Dev. 5th pctile Median 95th pctile
Total Branches 46.19 125.14 3 17 149
1959-2005 % Branch Growth 340.15 291.10 50 259.41 900
Number of Main Banks 1.91 1.06 0 2 3
Number of Local Banks 8.36 11.61 1 5 24
Share of Main Banks’ Branches 31.46 20.47 0 32.34 66.67
% Markets with Unicredit 0.71 0.45 0 1 1
Share of Unicredit’s Branches 4.64 7.20 0 1.90 20
% Markets with San Paolo 0.66 0.47 0 1 1
Share of San Paolo’s Branches 4.54 8.66 0 1.54 16.67
% Markets with MPS 0.53 0.50 0 1 1
Share of MPS’s Branches 2.68 4.89 0 0.43 12.50
Note: One observation is a Local Labor System. Main banks are Unicredit, San Paolo, and
MPS.
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Figure 4.1: HHI level over the period 1990-2005
Figure 4.2: Joint market shares of three main players over the period 1990-2005
Note: Local concentration is at the Local Labor System level.
Figure 4.3: Multimarket contacts for the three main players over the period 1990-
2005
Note: Multi market contact is the sum of Local Labor Systems where both banks
are present.
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4.3 The Model
The framework we construct builds on the work of Seim [2006], developing an entry
model with endogenous multi-market contact creation. The main contributions of
Seim [2006] were the introduction of incomplete information in static entry models,
as well as local players’ endogenous choice of spatial differentiation within a market.
Assuming that players have private information about their own profitability simpli-
fies the computation of equilibrium strategies, and provides a convenient solution to
the problem of multiple equilibria, as shown with an existence and uniqueness proof
that the author provides for a simple version of the game. Most importantly, it is
reasonable to think that agents have a better knowledge of their own profitability
compared to their rivals. This is particularly true for our application to the credit
sector, where the private information could be about creditworthiness of a bank’s
own borrowers, as well as about the stock of market-specific soft information that
the bank collects through lending relationships and years of experience in a local
market.
If on one hand we maintain the assumption of incomplete information, we
depart from Seim [2006]’s model in other dimensions. First, we concentrate on 3
main global players, instead of various local homogenous firms. This is a necessary
condition to model multi market contacts, as we need players’ identities to construct
their links across markets. It also allows us to analyze heterogeneous effects of multi
market contact on banks’ profitability. Second, we don’t let players choose their lo-
cation within a market,2 but instead allow their entry choices to be correlated across
different markets through the multi market contact index. The idea is to capture
player’s rivalry effects through their expectations of reciprocal contacts across mar-
kets, where these contacts are defined over different radiuses of distance between a
local market and its neighboring markets.
Let dfm = {0, 1} be the decision of a potential entrant firm f = 1, ..., F to
enter market m = 1, ...,M . We consider all the global players as potential entrants
in each market. The payoff function of firm f will be:
Πfm = α+ ξm + βXm + γZfm + δf
∑
g 6=f
1[Πgm > 0] ∗MMCfgm + εfm, (4.1)
where ξm are unobservable (to the econometrician) exogenous market char-
2 We are working on extending the model in this direction, as we have data on banks’ location
decisions within local markets.
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acteristics, Xm is a vector of observable demand and cost characteristics of market
m, and Zfm is a vector of observable characteristics of firm f in market m. Note
that we’re allowing the coefficient δf of the multi market contact index MMCfgm
to vary by firm, assuming thatMMCfgm might have heterogeneous effects on firms’
profitability. We can think of different degrees of heterogeneity across firms for the
effect of multi market contact on profitability. The coefficient on the MMC index
could also be homogeneous across banks (δ), or heterogeneous at the firm-pair level
(δgf ). We experiment with these three possible specifications in the estimation sec-
tion. We are also conditioning the effect for firm f of multiple contacts with rival
g on the actual presence of firm g in the market, through the indicator function
1[Πgm > 0].
The idiosyncratic component εfm of firm f ’s profits from operating in market
m is private information of firm f , and independently and identically distributed
over markets and firms. Assume εfm are IID draws from a type 1 extreme value
distribution. This distributional assumption guarantees computational tractability,
but requires firms to have a private information component in their profit function
that is specific to each market, and not correlated across markets and firms. Given
the local nature of retail banking (Degryse and Ongena [2005]), the IID condition
can be viewed as the bank-market specific soft information, which determines a
bank’s own profits and is not disclosed to its rivals to preserve an informational
advantage in a competitive market.
We do however allow for profit correlation across markets and firms through
the multi market contact index MMCfgm, which is defined as the ratio of the sum
of all contacts in other markets that firm f has with each other potential entrant g
in market m, over the total number of markets M minus one. This formula is quite
standard in the empirical multi market contact literature, as in Evans and Kessides
[1994] and Ciliberto and Williams [2013]. This differs from Seim [2006]’s work only in
one dimension, because Seim allows rival’s profitability (i.e. rivals’ entry probability)
to affect a firm’s profitability, modeling a strategic interaction among firms within
the same market, but still keeping the assumption of the shocks being uncorrelated
across firms within a market. We also allow for that, as the multimarket contact
index for firm f is weighted by the entry probability of each rival firm g, but on
top we model the strategic interaction of the same firm f across different markets
through the same index. A clear limitation of this index is that it is a reduced
form representation of a rivalry effect, which includes at the same time these two
dimensions of correlated profitability across markets and firms. This follows closely
the empirical reduced form literature on multimarket contact, starting from Evans
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and Kessides [1994], and would require a more coherent and sophisticated structural
model to be able to separately identify the multimarket contact effect from other
forms of strategic interactions among branches located in different markets of the
same firm.3
We construct the multimarket contact index as:
MMCfgm =
1
M − 1
∑
k 6=m
1[g and f both active in market k ]. (4.2)
Each firm forms an expectation of each rival’s optimal location choices. There-
fore, the expected profit of entering in market m is:
E[Πfm] = α+ ξm + βXm + γZfm + δf
∑
g 6=f
1[E(Πgm) > 0] ∗ E[MMCfgm] + εfm
= E[Πfm] + εfm. (4.3)
We can define the probability that competitor g 6= f chooses market m as:
pgm(dgm = 1 | ξ,X, θ) = Pr(E[Πgm] + εgm > 0), (4.4)
for every m, where θ = (α, β, γ, δ). All firms will have an expectation on
rivals’ entry probabilities:
E(Πgm) > 0 = pgm, (4.5)
3 A more structural approach is scope for future research.
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whereas the expected level of multi-market contact of firm f with firm g will
be:
E[MMCfgm] =
1
M − 1
∑
k 6=m
pgk ∗ pfk. (4.6)
Hence, we can construct a system of F ∗M equations that defines the equilib-
rium location conjectures as a fixed point of the mapping from the firm’s conjecture
of its rivals’ strategies into its rivals’ conjectures of the firm’s own strategy as follows:
pfm =
exp(α+ ξm + βXm + γZfm + δf
∑
g 6=f pgm
∑
k 6=m pgk∗pfk
M−1 )
1 + exp(α+ ξm + βXm + γZfm + δf
∑
g 6=f pgm
∑
k 6=m pgk∗pfk
M−1 )
=
exp(ξm) exp(Π˜fm)
1 + exp(ξm) exp(Π˜fm)
.
(4.7)
Existence and uniqueness of this Bayesian Nash equilibrium is discussed in
detail in Seim [2006].
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4.4 Econometric Specification
In order to estimate the model following Seim [2006], we assume that the expected
number of entrants predicted by the model equals the actual entrants in the data
Ωm. This is done to simplify the estimation of the highly nonlinear entry model
in 4.7, adjusting the market specific unobservable ξm until the expected number of
entrants equates the actual number of entrants in each market:
∑
f
pfm = Ωm, (4.8)
where Ωm is the total number of firms that have entered in market m, ac-
cording to the data. The method of using a market specific unobservable to induce
equivalence between predicted and actual number of entrants follows from Berry
[1994] and Berry et al. [1995], who applied it to equate predicted and actual market
shares in a differentiated products demand model. We can determine the market
specific unobservable ξm solving the system of equations 4.7 and 4.8, which in our
case, where the maximum number of entrants considered is F = 3, can be expressed
as:
exp(ξm)[exp(Π˜m1 )]
1 + exp(ξm)[exp(Π˜m1 )]
+
exp(ξm)[exp(Π˜m2 )]
1 + exp(ξm)[exp(Π˜m2 )]
+
exp(ξm)[exp(Π˜m3 )]
1 + exp(ξm)[exp(Π˜m3 )]
= Ωm.
(4.9)
In order to solve for exp(ξ), this can be further simplified to the following
market specific F th order polynomial:
F∑
f=1
(f − Ωm)[hm(f)] exp(ξ)f = Ωm, (4.10)
where hm(f) is a function that varies depending on f .4 This polynomial
can have at most F solutions. We select the solution that maximizes the likelihood
function compared to the other solutions.
The likelihood function is based on the probability of entry, conditional on the
distribution of the market specific unobservable component, and on the probability
of observing the ξm realization that equates predicted and actual number of entrants
4 See the appendix for the derivation of this polynomial, i.e. all the steps to go from 4.9 to 4.10,
and what exactly is the function hm(f).
96
in market m:
L(θ) =
∏
m
p(dfm|ξm, Xm,Ωm)g(ξm|Xm,Ωm). (4.11)
Under the assumption that ξm ∼ N(µ, σ2), the normal density g(ξm) of each
observation ξm will allow us to estimate the mean and standard deviation of the
distribution of market specific unobservables.
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4.5 Results
The empirical application we propose looks at the effect of multi market contact
on the 2005 market structure of the Italian banking sector. The idea of using the
single most recent cross section of data comes from the example of Bresnahan and
Reiss [1991]. Since their seminal contribution, several papers on entry have been
actually modeling a two-stage game of market structure, where firms simultaneously
decide to enter in the first period, and then compete on prices or quantities (Berry
[1992], Mazzeo [2002], Toivanen and Waterson [2005], Cohen and Mazzeo [2007]).
Most of the times the second stage is not modeled structurally, and its outcome
is approximated using a reduced form profit function. A clear limitation of these
models is the lack of dynamics, that requires to assume that the industry is in a
long run stable equilibrium. We follow this approach, assuming that after 15 years
of entry deregulation the industry has reached a stable and consolidated market
structure. 5
We focus primarily on the three main national banks, Unicredit, San Paolo,
and Monte dei Paschi di Siena, treating local, cooperative, and saving banks as a
competitive fringe. Following the model specification presented above, we construct
a reduced form profit function based on observable market and bank characteris-
tics, as well as on a multi market contact index. The market observable attributes
considered are surface, population, value added and employment rate to control for
market-specific exogenous demand or cost shifters. We also include the bank-market
specific distance from the bank’s national headquarter to proxy for any possible ben-
efits (costs) of opening a branch close to (far from) the main decisional centre of each
credit institution. One limitation of this model is that it consider entry by merger or
acquisition as a market-specific decision, even though most of these consolidations
involve acquiring branches in several markets. Perez-Saiz [2013] describes the prob-
lems in identifying the fundamental primitives of an entry model when the options
of greenfield entry and entry by acquisition are not considered as different strategies.
We are aware of these possible drawbacks, but a more rigorous modeling approach
is scope for future research.
We experimented with various indexes for multi market contact. The initial
5 We are working on relaxing this assumption, focusing only on entry between deregulation
(1990) and 2005. This would allow us to use pre-deregulation market structure as an exogenous
determinant for the evolution of multi market contact during the free entry period. The exogeneity
of the 1990’s market structure can be justified with the strict regulation that froze market structure
between 1936 and 1990, as described by Guiso et al. [2004]. The use of pre-existing firm’s presence
has been proposed first by Berry [1992], who exploited airlines’ airport presence as a determinant
of their route entry decisions.
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option we considered was including all the links that banks had across the country,
regarding a link as a LLS where both banks have at least one branch. This defi-
nition has at least two unrealistic assumptions. First, it implies that a price war
in the north western Bardonecchia area, bordering France, could potentially cause
retaliation in Siracusa, on the southern edge of Sicily, about 1150km far away. Mere
geographical distance is not the only reason why this is unlikely to happen. The main
justifications are the local nature of banking competition, as described in Degryse
and Ongena [2005], and the hierarchical structure of Italian banks’ decisions based
on regional headquarters explained in Albareto et al. [2011]. The second controver-
sial assumption is that banks could collude regardless of their market share in a LLS.
This is also an unrealistic condition, because collusion is likely to be more effective
in a concentrated oligopolistic market, as shown by Bernheim and Whinston [1990].
For these reasons we construct a LLS-bank specific multi market contact indi-
cator that considers only the neighboring local markets where the local competitive
fringe has less than 50% of total branches. We have run several robustness checks
varying the distance of bordering LLSs as well as the market share of local banks.
We find evidence that multi market contact matters less for greater distances or for
higher share of branches of local players. In order to include the bordering markets
in the multi market contact index we construct a measure of geographical distance
between the main city councils of each LLS based on latitude and longitude coordi-
nates. Given that the average surface of a LLS is about 400km2, and assuming that
the main city council is situated at the centre of the LLS, the mean distance between
main municipalities is about 23km. We experiment including neighboring LLS that
are up to 100km far away, finding a decline in the effect of the multi market index
as distance grows.
We decide to exclude the largest metropolitan areas from the sample, as
done in Cohen and Mazzeo [2007], to avoid having overlapping submarkets within a
LLS. Hence, we drop the local markets above the 90th percentile of the population
distribution. We have run some robustness checks and verified that our results are
not sensitive to this particular cutoff point.
The estimation results are summarized in Table 4.3, 4.4, and 4.5. The first
table shows some reduced form evidence from logit regressions for each of the 3
players. These results are then used as starting values for the structural estimation.
The logit estimates show how the multi market contact index matters the most for
closer distances and for lower market share of the competitive fringe. If on one hand
the surface of the LLS doesn’t seem to matter for banks’ entry decision, on the other
hand both population and value added have a positive and significant effect. The
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employment rate appears to have a negative impact on entry.
The structural estimates in Table 4.4 confirm most of the reduced form re-
sults, but are partially different for the MMC indexes. Multiple links don’t seem to
matter at all for MPS, whereas they are increasingly significant for Sanpaolo as dis-
tance is reduced. Unicredit’s profitability is significantly influenced by multi market
contacts only for larger distances.
Finally, in Table 4.5 we look at different degrees of heterogeneity in the effect
of multi market contact on banks’ profitability, as in Ciliberto and Tamer [2009].
In this case we fix the distance of neighboring markets to 100km and just focus on
Local Labor Systems where the share of local banks is less than 50%. We consider the
case of homogeneous effect of multi market contact, heterogeneous across banks, and
heterogeneous across bank-to-bank relationships. We find a positive and significant
effect for the homogenous effect, a positive and significant effect for Unicredit and
San Paolo in the first heterogeneous effect, and no statistically significant effect at the
bank-to-bank relationship. This might be evidence that the three credit institutions
don’t value differently each of their competitors, but are rather affected by the sum
of the contacts with their rivals.
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Table 4.3: Reduced form logit results
Variable Distance<50km Distance<50km Distance<50km Distance<100km
Local Share<50% Local Share<40% Local Share<60% Local Share<50%
UC SP MPS UC SP MPS UC SP MPS UC SP MPS
Surface 0.936 -0.324 -0.498 0.919 -0.387 -0.761 0.904 -0.362 -0.489 0.955 -0.348 -0.722
(0.664) (0.575) (0.478) (0.669) (0.572) (0.470) (0.661) (0.571) (0.478) (0.668) (0.574) (0.470)
Population 0.583∗∗∗ 0.631∗∗∗ 0.475∗∗∗ 0.585∗∗∗ 0.634∗∗∗ 0.474∗∗∗ 0.560∗∗∗ 0.632∗∗∗ 0.470∗∗∗ 0.572∗∗∗ 0.626∗∗∗ 0.468∗∗∗
(0.079) (0.069) (0.051) (0.078) (0.069) (0.050) (0.079) (0.069) (0.051) (0.078) (0.069) (0.050)
Value Added 1.859∗∗∗ 0.590∗ 0.596∗ 1.912∗∗∗ 0.617∗ 0.641∗ 1.813∗∗∗ 0.578∗ 0.603∗ 2.073∗∗∗ 0.684∗∗ 0.710∗∗
(0.401) (0.343) (0.337) (0.396) (0.344) (0.333) (0.401) (0.343) (0.339) (0.401) (0.343) (0.335)
Employment Rate -0.907∗∗ -1.325∗∗∗ -1.521∗∗∗ -0.939∗∗∗ -1.342∗∗∗ -1.629∗∗∗ -0.777∗∗ -1.310∗∗∗ -1.346∗∗∗ -0.931∗∗ -1.332∗∗∗ -1.578∗∗∗
(0.374) (0.344) (0.309) (0.368) (0.344) (0.305) (0.377) (0.346) (0.313) (0.373) (0.344) (0.307)
MMC Unicredit 0.514∗∗∗ - - 0.921∗∗∗ - - 0.315∗∗∗ - - 0.176∗∗∗ - -
(0.083) (-) (-) (0.167) (-) (-) (0.046) (-) (-) (0.028) (-) (-)
MMC Sanpaolo - 0.153∗∗ - - 0.214∗∗ - - 0.084∗∗ - - 0.053∗∗ -
(-) (0.061) (-) (-) (0.109) (-) (-) (0.038) (-) (-) (0.021) (-)
MMC MPS - - 0.294∗∗∗ - - 0.164 - - 0.215∗∗∗ - - 0.056∗∗
(-) (-) (0.072) (-) (-) (0.123) (-) (-) (0.048) (-) (-) (0.028)
Headquarter Unicredit 0.459 - - 0.364 - - 0.673 - - 0.813 - -
(0.757) (-) (-) (0.750) (-) (-) (0.758) (-) (-) (0.754) (-) (-)
Headquarter Sanpaolo - -1.461∗∗ - - -1.403∗∗ - - -1.405∗∗ - - -1.315∗∗ -
(-) (0.670) (-) (-) (0.670) (-) (-) (0.700) (-) (-) (0.665) (-)
Headquarter MPS - - -5.077∗∗∗ - - -4.861∗∗∗ - - -4.579∗∗∗ - - -4.626∗∗∗
(-) (-) (0.768) (-) (-) (0.757) (-) (-) (0.758) (-) (-) (0.750)
Intercept -0.831 4.116∗∗∗ 5.462∗∗∗ -0.578 4.182∗∗∗ 6.100∗∗∗ -1.600 4.031∗∗ 4.395∗∗∗ -1.338 3.907∗∗ 5.577∗∗∗
(1.746) (1.584) (1.231) (1.718) (1.585) (1.216) (1.768) (1.591) (1.275) (1.758) (1.593) (1.256)
Markets 617 617 617 617 617 617 617 617 617 617 617 617
R2 0.379 0.313 0.303 0.372 0.310 0.285 0.388 0.311 0.310 0.374 0.313 0.288
LR χ2 293.64 255.63 259.11 288.31 253.21 243.79 300.28 254.28 263.35 289.52 255.69 245.98
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Note: Standard errors are in brackets. ∗ is 10% significance level, ∗∗ is 5% significance level, ∗∗∗ is 1% significance level.
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Table 4.4: Structural estimates varying distance from the market and share of local banks
Variable Distance<50km Distance<50km Distance<50km Distance<100km
Local Share<50% Local Share<40% Local Share<60% Local Share<50%
Surface -0.533∗ -0.571∗ -0.414 -0.408
(0.299) (0.301) (0.308) (0.289)
Population 0.513∗∗∗ 0.517∗∗∗ 0.528∗∗∗ 0.495∗∗∗
(0.032) (0.031) (0.033) (0.034)
Value Added 1.001∗∗∗ 1.042∗∗∗ 0.979∗∗∗ 0.956∗∗∗
(0.188) (0.186) (0.192) (0.181)
Employment Rate -1.548∗∗∗ -1.520∗∗∗ -1.571∗∗∗ -1.428∗∗∗
(0.186) (0.187) (0.192) (0.182)
MMC Unicredit -0.142 0.490 -0.097 0.798∗∗
(0.389) (0.569) (0.406) (0.346)
MMC Sanpaolo 1.652∗∗∗ 3.037∗∗∗ 0.302 0.785∗∗
(0.473) (0.881) (0.336) (0.333)
MMC MPS -0.140 -0.489 -0.498∗ -0.282
(0.288) (0.364) (0.262) (0.244)
Headquarter Unicredit -0.838∗∗∗ -0.946∗∗∗ -0.997∗∗∗ -0.948∗∗
(0.391) (0.382) (0.415) (0.377)
Headquarter Sanpaolo -1.635∗∗∗ -1.562∗∗∗ -1.498∗∗∗ -1.349∗∗∗
(0.365) (0.366) (0.383) (0.371)
Headquarter MPS -4.095∗∗∗ -4.010∗∗∗ -4.001∗∗∗ -3.358∗∗∗
(0.559) (0.551) (0.578) (0.555)
Intercept 5.081∗∗∗ 4.904∗∗∗ 5.225∗∗∗ 4.425∗∗∗
(0.811) (0.819) (0.841) (0.800)
µ -4.904∗∗∗ -4.911∗∗∗ -4.903∗∗∗ -4.907
(0.202) (0.202) (0.202) (0.202)
σ 4.861∗∗∗ 4.857∗∗∗ 4.863∗∗∗ 4.859∗∗∗
(0.679) (0.673) (0.682) (0.681)
Markets 617 617 617 617
Note: Standard errors are in brackets. ∗ is 10% significance level, ∗∗ is 5% significance level, ∗∗∗ is 1% significance level.
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Table 4.5: Structural estimates varying heterogeneity in the effect of multi market
contact
Variable Homogeneous MMC Bank MMC Bank-to-Bank MMC
Surface 0.829 0.870 0.888
(0.903) (0.898) (0.897)
Population 2.012∗∗∗ 2.003∗∗∗ 1.994∗∗∗
(0.096) (0.095) (0.114)
Value Added 0.537∗∗∗ 0.532∗∗∗ 0.533∗∗∗
(0.060) (0.060) (0.061)
Employment Rate -0.615∗∗∗ -0.615∗∗∗ -0.612∗∗∗
(0.061) (0.061) (0.063)
MMC 0.324∗∗∗ - -
(0.089)
MMC Unicredit - 0.517∗ -
(0.356)
MMC Sanpaolo - 0.609∗ -
(0.348)
MMC MPS - 0.0003 -
(0.274)
MMC Unicredit-Sanpaolo - - 0.0005
(2.288)
MMC Unicredit-MPS - - 1.627
(3.373)
MMC Sanpaolo-Unicredit - - 0.883
(2.212)
MMC Sanpaolo-MPS - - 0.002
(3.433)
MMC MPS-Unicredit - - 0.001
(6.531)
MMC MPS-Sanpaolo - - 0.001
(7.036)
Headquarter Unicredit 0.049 -0.016 -0.037
(0.179) (0.224) (0.247)
Headquarter Sanpaolo -0.177 -0.281 -0.227
(0.167) (0.215) (0.238)
Headquarter MPS -1.403∗∗∗ -1.173∗∗∗ -1.185∗∗∗
(0.226) (0.260) (0.300)
Intercept 0.138∗∗∗ 0.137∗∗∗ 0.135∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.027) (0.029)
µ -0.035 -0.035 -0.035
(0.058) (0.058) (0.059)
σ 0.462∗∗∗ 0.463∗∗∗ 0.463∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Markets 617 617 617
Note: Standard errors are in brackets. In this specification we always keep distance less
than 100km and share of local players less than 50%. ∗ is 10% significance level, ∗∗ is 5%
significance level, ∗∗∗ is 1% significance level. The coefficients for "Bank MMC" are
slightly different in magnitude from the last column in Table 4.4 due to a small difference
in the scaling of some variables.
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4.6 Conclusion
This paper investigates the effect of multi market contact on entry decisions of the
main Italian banks. It extends a well established static model of market structure
with incomplete information, developed by Seim [2006], allowing for endogenous
multi market contact creation and heterogeneous bank profitability. We focus on
the 2005 market structure for the three main credit institutions in Italy: Unicredit,
Intesa San Paolo, and Monte dei Paschi di Siena. We also use a novel definition
of geographical markets in Italian banking, that are the local labor systems (LLS)
instead of provinces. These local markets are comparable in size to the Labor Market
Areas in the US, used for most of the entry literature in the US, and are defined
according to integrated economic areas and commuting patterns between councils.
For these reasons, the LLS are likely to represent more accurately the area where
banks compete.
We analyze how the number of contacts that a multi market bank has with its
potential rivals affects its entry decision in a specific market. We find that multiple
links in the neighboring markets enhance banks’ profitability, with a stronger effect
when the local competitive fringe has a lower market share and when the number of
neighboring markets is bigger. We also allow for different degrees of heterogeneity
in the effect of multi market contact on profitability across banks, and still find
a positive impact, apart from the bank-to-bank relationship level. Therefore, our
results suggest that banks find it profitable to establish contacts between each other,
which might facilitate implicit collusion as in Bernheim and Whinston [1990].
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4.7 Appendix
The derivation of the polynomial starts from equation 9, expressed here for the case
of 3 players:
Ωm = p1m + p2m + p3m
=
exp(ξm)[exp(Π˜m1 )]
1+exp(ξm)[exp(Π˜m1 )]
+
exp(ξm)[exp(Π˜m2 )]
1+exp(ξm)[exp(Π˜m2 )]
+
exp(ξm)[exp(Π˜m3 )]
1+exp(ξm)[exp(Π˜m3 )]
.
(4.12)
This expression can be developed as:
Ωm ∗
[
1 + exp(ξm)[exp(Π˜m1 )]
] ∗ [1 + exp(ξm)[exp(Π˜m2 )]] ∗ [1 + exp(ξm)[exp(Π˜m3 )]]
=
[
exp(ξm)[exp(Π˜m1 )]
] ∗ [1 + exp(ξm)[exp(Π˜m2 )]] ∗ [1 + exp(ξm)[exp(Π˜m3 )]]
+
[
exp(ξm)[exp(Π˜m2 )]
] ∗ [1 + exp(ξm)[exp(Π˜m1 )]] ∗ [1 + exp(ξm)[exp(Π˜m3 )]]
+
[
exp(ξm)[exp(Π˜m3 )]
] ∗ [1 + exp(ξm)[exp(Π˜m1 )]] ∗ [1 + exp(ξm)[exp(Π˜m2 )]],
(4.13)
where the LHS of equation 13 becomes:
Ωm + Ωm exp(ξ
m)
[
exp(Π˜m1 ) + exp(Π˜
m
2 ) + exp(Π˜
m
3 )
]
+ Ωm exp(ξ
m)2
[
[exp(Π˜m1 )] ∗ [exp(Π˜m2 )] + [exp(Π˜m1 )] ∗ [exp(Π˜m3 )] + [exp(Π˜m2 )] ∗ [exp(Π˜m3 )]
]
+ Ωm exp(ξ
m)3
[
[exp(Π˜m1 )] ∗ [exp(Π˜m2 )] ∗ [exp(Π˜m3 )]
}
,
(4.14)
and the RHS of equation 13 becomes:
{
exp(ξm)[exp(Π˜m1 )] + exp(ξ
m)2
[
[exp(Π˜m1 )] ∗ [exp(Π˜m2 )] + [exp(Π˜m1 )] ∗ [exp(Π˜m3 )]
]
+ exp(ξm)3[exp(Π˜m1 )] ∗ [exp(Π˜m2 )] ∗ [exp(Π˜m3 )]
}
+
{
exp(ξm)[exp(Π˜m2 )] + exp(ξ
m)2
[
[exp(Π˜m1 )] ∗ [exp(Π˜m2 )] + [exp(Π˜m2 )] ∗ [exp(Π˜m3 )]
]
+ exp(ξm)3[exp(Π˜m1 )] ∗ [exp(Π˜m2 )] ∗ [exp(Π˜m3 )]
}
+
{
exp(ξm)[exp(Π˜m3 )] + exp(ξ
m)2
[
[exp(Π˜m1 )] ∗ [exp(Π˜m3 )] + [exp(Π˜m2 )] ∗ [exp(Π˜m3 )]
]
+ exp(ξm)3[exp(Π˜m1 )] ∗ [exp(Π˜m2 )] ∗ [exp(Π˜m3 )]
}
.
(4.15)
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The RHS can be further simplified to:
exp(ξm)
[
exp(Π˜m1 ) + exp(Π˜
m
2 ) + exp(Π˜
m
3 )
]
+ 2 exp(ξm)2
[
[exp(Π˜m1 )] ∗ [exp(Π˜m2 )] + [exp(Π˜m1 )] ∗ [exp(Π˜m3 )] + [exp(Π˜m2 )] ∗ [exp(Π˜m3 )]
]
+ 3 exp(ξm)3
[
[exp(Π˜m1 )] ∗ [exp(Π˜m2 )] ∗ [exp(Π˜m3 )]
]
.
(4.16)
Bringing now back together LHS and RHS we get:
(3− Ωm) exp(ξm)3
[
[exp(Π˜m1 )] ∗ [exp(Π˜m2 )] ∗ [exp(Π˜m3 )]
]
+ (2− Ωm) exp(ξm)2
[
[exp(Π˜m1 )] ∗ [exp(Π˜m2 )] + [exp(Π˜m1 )] ∗ [exp(Π˜m3 )] + [exp(Π˜m2 )] ∗ [exp(Π˜m3 )]
]
+ (1− Ωm) exp(ξm)
[
exp(Π˜m1 ) + exp(Π˜
m
2 ) + exp(Π˜
m
3 )
]
− Ωm = 0,
(4.17)
which is equivalent to equation 10 in Section 3.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
This thesis is formed by three coherently connected papers that investigate the rela-
tionship between asymmetric information, imperfect competition, and market struc-
ture in the Italian banking sector.
The first paper measures the welfare costs of asymmetric information and
imperfect competition in the market for small business credit lines. First, it presents
reduced form evidence of adverse selection and moral hazard, conducting a positive
correlation test à la Chiappori and Salanié [2000]. Based on these results, it develops
a structural model of firms’ demand for credit, loan use and default, and of banks’
pricing. It provides a simplified Monte Carlo simulation of the model, showing that
imperfect competition can mitigate the effect of adverse selection. The estimates
of the structural model report presence of adverse selection, but not of moral haz-
ard. Finally, two counterfactual policy experiments are constructed. The first one
recovers the welfare costs of asymmetric information, the second one predicts the
consequences of a credit crunch on a credit market with asymmetric information
and imperfect competition.
This paper could be extended in several dimensions. A first direction could
entail enriching the theoretical foundations of the baseline model to separately iden-
tify asymmetric information and risk aversion. So far the paper assumes risk neu-
trality on both the borrower’s and the lender’s side, as in Stiglitz and Weiss [1981].
However, following the example of Cohen and Einav [2007], expected utility theory
could help to recover risk aversion for borrowers. Along these lines, it would be
interesting also to estimate a risk aversion parameter for lenders, especially in the
context of a financial crisis, possibly allowing for risk aversion heterogeneity among
banks. The supply side of this paper is another part that could be extended, or
at least modeled differently. Currently we rely on the assumption of posted prices
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for new borrowers, even though we don’t observe these prices directly in the data.
It could be also reasonable to think that interest rates charged by lenders are the
results of a bargaining process with borrowers, in the presence of asymmetric in-
formation. It would be also interesting to extend the welfare analysis considering
other counterfactual policy experiments, such as reducing the extent of competition
simulating a bank merger.
The second paper builds on the first paper’s model, analyzing the effect of
asymmetric information on the banking market structure. It begins providing de-
scriptives and reduced form evidence of how experienced incumbent banks have an
informational advantage over potential entrants, which allows them to have a more
creditworthy pool of borrowers. Moreover, it is showed that the longer experience
of incumbent banks plays a significant role in deterring new banks from entering.
Given these results, the paper develops a dynamic structural model of banks’ entry,
exit and investment through branching, which allows them to gain experience and
learn about their borrowers. Using the notion of oblivious equilibrium developed by
Weintraub et al. [2008b] gives a tractable solution to the computational problem of
many players and a nonstationary environment.
This paper sets the basis for various possible extensions. First, it allows
for a relatively reduced form learning process based on the definition of experience.
This could be enriched assuming that lenders learn through time either the firm-
specific default probability, or a market-bank specific correlation coefficient that
identifies asymmetric information. Second, it would be important to have a bet-
ter understanding of the dynamic evolution of the relationships between borrowers
and lenders. How does a lender acquire soft information about a borrower? How
is this reflected into the pricing strategy? Do search and switching costs increase
for borrowers as the relationship with a lender evolves? Petersen and Rajan [1995]
provide theoretical grounds to answer to these questions, looking at the effect of
credit market competition on lending relationships. Third, this paper focuses pri-
marily on entry barriers from informational asymmetries in the credit market. It
could be the case however that there are other sources of entry barriers, such as
scale economies, as banks might have a different cost structure depending on their
size, or as scope economies, as banks might have heterogeneous costs depending on
their area of lending specialization.
The last paper investigates the relationship between multi market contacts
between banks and market structure. It concentrates on the main Italian credit
institutions, and develops a static structural model of market structure based on
Seim [2006], with endogenous multi market contact creation. The main finding of
108
the paper is that multiple links with rivals in neighboring markets have a positive and
significant effect on a banks’ decision to enter into a market. This effect is stronger
for closer markets and for markets where the main banks have a stronger presence,
suggesting that multi market contact might facilitate collusion as in Bernheim and
Whinston [1990].
This work could also be extended in various ways. One of its main limita-
tions is the static approach, as entry and the creation of contacts across markets are
inherently dynamic decisions. Hence, using a dynamic model would be a natural ex-
tension. Another improvement could concern the specification of the profit function.
So far we have assumed a reduced form profit function, for lack of data on prices
and quantities. Having access to additional data would allow us to model demand
and pricing, and to construct a profit function based on these fundamentals. Within
such a structural model we could allow banks to collude on prices, as Ciliberto and
Williams [2013] did for the airline industry, where they identified conduct param-
eters using multi market contacts. We could then allow banks to take entry and
exit decisions based on this structural model with collusion and endogenous multi
market contact creation.
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